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April 2024

**WORKINGPAPER SERIES**

Number 580b

# **A Comparison of the Socioeconomic and Gendered Organization of Social Reproduction in the United States and United Kingdom, 1973–2013**

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## **Abstract**

Drawing on both gender regime theory and social reproduction theory, this paper compares the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction in the United States and United Kingdom from 1973 to 2013. Integrating data from the Luxembourg Income Study, the Multinational Time-Use Study, and additional sources, we examine how men and women of different socioeconomic groups contribute to social reproduction through household production, paid work, and government social benefits. Our results demonstrate that household social reproduction has not been universally refamilialized, marketized, or desocialized in either country. While there is some evidence of degendering, questions remain about its feminist implications.

**SER key words: family, gender, income distribution, neoliberalism, social reproduction, welfare state**

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## 1. Introduction

In the United States and the United Kingdom—along with much of the advanced capitalist world—the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries were a time of social and economic transformation. Gender norms, labor relations, and standards of living all changed in profound ways. Welfare states—which structure gender relations by influencing the distribution of paid and unpaid work and by determining eligibility for state redistribution—experienced numerous expansions, contractions, and reforms. Neoliberal policies weakened labor protections, liberalized trade, and brought various policies that favored the interests of capital over labor, dramatically increasing economic inequality in both the United States and United Kingdom (Harvey 2007, 16–17). At the same time, feminist movements raised critical consciousness, changing laws and social practices. The resulting political, economic, and social changes had significant implications for gender equality both in the workplace and the home, with gains and setbacks occurring throughout this period (Newman 2013).

Two distinct traditions in feminist scholarship can illuminate the effect of these social transformations by theorizing gender at the macro level. Gender regime theory (GRT), as developed by Walby (2020, 414), provides a starting point to “deepen the feminist debates to better engage with macro-level transformations.” Walby (2020, 416) argues that there is an “under-theorization of gender in macro accounts of social transformation” due to the “reduction of gender to either family or culture.” Instead, various institutional domains—such as the economy, polity, civil society, and violence—compose gender regimes.<sup>1</sup> Social reproduction theory (SRT) views the daily and generational reproduction of labor power—the capacity to work—as a macro-level outcome that articulates gender relations in capitalist

societies. SRT analyzes the political-economic causes and consequences of the reorganization of responsibility for social reproduction among institutions such as households, markets, and the state (Ferguson 2020; Bhattacharya 2017).<sup>2</sup> In addition to proposing numerous empirical questions, the SRT framework contains a unitary theory of oppression that understands gender and class relations to be intrinsically linked.

An analysis based in a SRT framework relates to, but also differs from, traditional feminist literature on the welfare state and care regimes. Welfare state typologies that integrate a gender perspective, such as those suggested by Korpi (2000), Lewis (2001), and Walby (2020), classify how policy regimes interact with markets and families. The dominant focus has been to examine how the welfare state does or does not enable gender parity in market and home production, identifying the outcome variable as women's labor force participation or the distribution of unpaid work within households. The related care regime literature focuses on how the organization of care labor and care provision influences women's labor force participation and global hierarchies, based on gender, class, and race/ethnicity. Liberal care regimes, for instance, are characterized by limited public care services and heightened class and racial stratification, as well as reliance on global international migrant care chains (Bettio and Plantenga 2004). The SRT framework adopts an integrated outcome variable—the organization of social reproduction—that pertains to the institutions, strategies, and ideologies that make it possible for the work of social reproduction to be accomplished (Laslett and Brenner 1989, 383). The SRT framework that we adopt is a consumption-based analysis of the total resources used by households for the quotidian maintenance and replenishment of labor power.

Drawing on SRT and GRT, our research interrogates incomplete accounts of the effects of macro-level transformations since the 1970s on the organization of social reproduction. The SRT literature has typically relied on historical analysis and aggregated data that analyze the implications of social and policy changes from a critical feminist perspective. Analyses of the impact of neoliberalism on social reproduction have not examined nationally representative survey data on household production, earned income, or receipt of government social benefits (Bakker and Gill 2019; Benzanson and Luxton 2006; Bhattacharya 2017). Empirical SRT studies using aggregated data, as in Moos (2021) and Maqueira and Moos (2024), have not analyzed gendered shifts in the organization of social reproduction.

We ask the following questions about the effect of macro-level transformations on the organization of social reproduction. First, what patterns emerged in the socioeconomic and gendered organization of household social reproduction in the United States and United Kingdom between 1973 and 2013? Second, do we find quantitative evidence that the organization of household social reproduction has been universally *refamilialized* (an increase in reliance on unpaid work), *marketized* (an increase in dependence on paid work), or *desocialized* (a retrenchment of state support)? Has the organization of household social reproduction been *degendered* (an equal distribution of the responsibility for social reproduction between men and women)?

To investigate these questions, we create a novel, integrated dataset based on individual-level survey data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the Multinational Time-Use Study (MTUS). This dataset contains harmonized household survey data on earned income, social

benefits, and unpaid household production. It is further complemented with data on public and private health spending from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Statistics), as well as public education expenditures data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). We operationalize SRT for the purpose of a comparative analysis of the contributions of men and women of different socioeconomic quintiles to household social reproduction in the United States and United Kingdom.

Our empirical findings contribute important insights to both the GRT and SRT literatures. We find that the organization of household social reproduction has not been universally refamilialized, marketized, or desocialized in either country during this time. Instead, we find evidence that changes in the organization of household social reproduction vary by socioeconomic status, reflecting the persistence of the underlying system of stratification. A key finding is the socioeconomic stratification of women's contribution for social reproduction, reflecting the relevance of class politics to struggles for gender equality. In both countries, the lower a women's socioeconomic status, the higher her contribution to social reproduction. While there is some evidence of progress toward degendering, questions remain about the feminist implications of this finding.

## **2. Measuring Social Reproduction: Data and Measures**

We analyze social reproduction in material terms, measured as the total resources a household has access to and employs to socially reproduce its members. We conceive of the social reproduction of individuals and households as primarily relying on three flows: "paid work"

consisting of labor income and employer-based benefits net of taxes, “household production” consisting of unpaid domestic and care work, and “social benefits” consisting of cash and in-kind social benefits that households receive from the state. While not all performed in the market or exchanged for pay, these resources are measured in a common denomination—2011 USD dollars—to combine and compare them across time and nation.<sup>3</sup> This requires imputing a “price” for household production.

Our operationalization of social reproduction illustrates that the reproduction of labor power depends on various economic institutions that have gendered dimensions. We analyze the structure and transformation in the configuration of how households of different socioeconomic groups access these resources. We ask if the changes of relative contributions take place more markedly for lower or higher income households, and if they happen due to changes in men’s or women’s patterns of paid and unpaid work.

Our measure of social reproduction is related to, but distinct from, other measures that move beyond gross money income. For example, the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-being (LIMEW) incorporates earned income, the value of public transfers and consumption, an imputed value of household production, and income from wealth (see Zacharias et al. 2018, 5). Due to data limitations, our measure excludes income from wealth and public consumption. An advantage of our approach is that we can estimate our measure at the individual level, which is necessary for a gendered analysis. Conceiving of these resources as part and parcel of the social reproduction of labor power grounds our empirical analysis in a feminist theoretical tradition.

## **2.1 Data Sources**

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is our core data source, which we use to obtain information on households' labor and non-labor income. The LIS harmonizes nationally representative surveys on income to enable cross-national comparative analyses. The LIS data for the United States draws on the Current Population Survey March Supplement (1968–2013) and the data for the United Kingdom draws on the Family Expenditure Survey (1969–1991) and the Family Resources Survey (1994–2013). For both countries, the LIS includes comprehensive income information from all adults in the household, which enables us to create household-level measures as well as examine gender dynamics within households.

The Multinational Time-Use Study (MTUS) harmonizes nationally representative time-use surveys, which we use to obtain estimates about home production. The United States MTUS data draws on a historical series of time-use surveys (1965–2001) and the American Time Use Survey (2003–2013), while the United Kingdom MTUS data draws on a series of independent time-use surveys (1965–2013).

The OECD health expenditures data collects information on the healthcare spending of governments and individuals with private insurance. We use this data to estimate per capita spending by the governments of the United States and United Kingdom, as well as spending by employers offering private health insurance plans.<sup>4</sup> We obtain public spending on K–12 education in the United Kingdom from UNESCO. For public spending on education in the United States, we rely on the FRED data.

## **2.2 Measures**



In this section we describe how we measure the three social reproduction flows of interest: paid work, home production, and social benefits. Appendix Table S1 provides more details about the construction of each of these measures.

“Paid work” includes all income from wage labor in a given year. More specifically, this measure is the sum of total income from labor and employer-based benefits minus income taxes and social security contributions. To construct this measure, we draw on LIS data on labor income, income from private pensions, income taxes, and social security contributions, and we use OECD data on private health plans to obtain estimates of average employer contributions to healthcare.

“Home production” represents the imputed monetary value of time investments in housework and care work as a primary activity (see Table S1 Note 1 for detailed activity codes).<sup>5</sup> We use the MTUS to calculate average time spent on home production, annualize this measure to represent the full year, and merge this information with the LIS data. Next, we assign monetary value to time investments in home production by multiplying each hour of unpaid work by the average wage. United States wage data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) historical series on hourly earnings of private production and nonsupervisory employees; the United Kingdom wage data come from the Long Run Back Series (1963–1999) and the Average Weekly Earnings data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2000–2015). The United Kingdom data reflect average earnings in the whole economy and are transformed to hourly wages. Scholars remain divided on the appropriate approach to imputing a value for home production (see Moos 2021b). We prefer average wages over minimum wages or estimates of

opportunity costs based on the caregivers' earning potential because we believe the average wage better approximates the actual replacement cost and societal benefit for various types of domestic work.

“Social benefits” include income from government transfers, health spending, and education. This measure is the sum of public benefits (such as parental leave, child allowances, unemployment, sickness and work injury, disability, etc.), contributory and non-contributory pensions, and government spending on health and education. To construct this measure, we draw on LIS data on public benefits income, OECD data for government spending on public healthcare plans, and UNESCO and FRED data on public education. See Table S1 for more information on how the OECD data is merged into the LIS.

We calculate each of the three flows of social reproduction at the household level and by gender. Household-level measures represent the 2011 USD PPP value of households' annual flows coming from paid work, home production, and social benefits. For instance, a hypothetical household's social reproduction might comprise \$60,000 from paid work, \$40,000 from home production, and \$20,000 from social benefits; the total, \$120,000, represents the total value of social reproduction. Gender-specific measures indicate whether social reproduction flows come from women or men in the household. See Table S1 Note 2 for more information on how we split by gender the social benefits components that are not available at the individual level.

We calculate average household-level and gender-specific paid work, home production, and social benefits flows across all households and by household income quintile group. The lowest-

earning quintile (Q1) can be thought of as “low-income” households. In 2013, these households earned on average \$14,233 in the United States and \$12,649 in the United Kingdom. The second-to-lowest earning quintile (Q2)—“lower-middle-income” households—earned on average \$33,606 in the United States and \$23,076 in the United Kingdom in 2013. “Middle-income” households (Q3) earned between \$54,371 in the United States and \$34,515 in the United Kingdom in 2013. “Upper-middle-income” households (Q4) earned between \$84,736 in the United States and \$51,914 in the United Kingdom in 2013. Finally, “high-income” households (Q5) earned at least \$184,570 in the United States and \$101,852 in the United Kingdom in 2013.<sup>6</sup>

All calculations use survey weights to adequately represent the population. Because not all datasets include data for the same years, some measures draw from data for the year before or after the focal year. See Table S2 for more information.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our analysis. We report the sample size for the two survey datasets we use (LIS and MTUS) and estimates of the three flows of social reproduction.

**Table 1.** Descriptive Statistics.

	Sample size		Paid work	Home production	Social benefits	Time spent on home production per day		Average wage	
	LIS	MTUS				Women	Men		
US	1974	11475	6913	38756.79	50255.54	5383.85	4.80	2.00	20.24
	1985	58897	2701	37045.48	43651.48	6271.64	4.20	2.30	18.31
	1995	49682	1133	41204.88	42897.6	7584.87	4.20	2.50	17.20
	2004	76447	12851	48324.77	47423.12	8863.45	4.40	2.60	18.68
	2013	51498	10410	48208.35	45916.46	11501.65	4.00	2.50	19.44
UK	1974	6695	14746	18208.41	16177.64	2628.67	4.50	1.30	7.61
	1987	7154	10100	16399.7	23284.9	6423.42	4.50	2.00	9.62
	1995	26435	1843	21234.9	25306.28	7649.61	4.00	2.00	11.48
	2005	28029	4748	29384.51	34901.92	11672.48	4.10	2.40	14.15
	2014	19535	14285	28628.45	32428.18	14122.56	3.90	2.30	14.28

*Source:* LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note:* Selected years in each decade, years selected based on data availability (see Table S2 for more details).

### 2.3 Limitations and Sensitivity Analyses

Our analysis contains several limitations related to our use of available data. First, we abstract from both wealth (inheritance, saving, dissaving) and borrowing (consumption smoothing and debt repayment), although both components are important to household social reproduction and economic inequality (Roberts 2013). Second, our analysis of the state’s role in household social reproduction comprises direct government transfers and public expenditures on healthcare and education but does not include an estimated share of total social spending, as is included in Moos (2021), Maqueira and Moos (2024), and the LIMEW method. This means that our analysis excludes components of the welfare state’s contribution to social reproduction through public good provision such as care institutions, physical infrastructure, sanitation, transportation, recreation, cultural institutions, and so on. Third, our quantification of social reproduction does not capture the emotional, affective, intimate, biological, or ideological

aspects of women's reproductive labor. This underestimates both the time spent on social reproduction, as well as its meaning and effect. Fourth, we are not able to compare intersectional inequalities between the two countries.<sup>7</sup> While the social construction and politics of race, ethnicity, and migration differ in the two countries and must be carefully historicized, intersectional inequalities are inherent to systems of social reproduction and gender politics everywhere (Williams 2023). Finally, our period of study ends three years before the BREXIT referendum and the election of Donald Trump. The rise of populist politics and the ensuing political-economic shocks have had major implications for women's rights, migrant labor, and social spending that are not captured by our analysis. We acknowledge these limitations to contextualize our analysis as well as to identify important areas of future research.

We performed several sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to alternative operationalizations. First, we analyzed time spent on home production as a secondary activity and time spent with children while not engaged in home production as a primary or secondary activity. Second, we used the minimum wage to value home production instead of the average wage, and we excluded social benefits not reported in the LIS (healthcare and education). Third, we reexamined the results for the United States after substituting the OECD healthcare data with the more detailed data from the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). Fourth, we performed supplementary analyses examining the importance of racial stratification in the organization of social reproduction in the United States. None of these results substantively altered the patterns we observed. See Online

Appendix Tables S11-14 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of these supplementary analyses.

### 3 Results

We begin by analyzing differences in the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction across household income quintiles in the two countries. Table 2 shows households' average reliance on each of the three flows—paid work, home production, and social benefits—expressed as a percent of total social reproduction.<sup>8</sup> These averages are calculated over the entire period of study and the percentage change, discussed below, measures over-time changes. For instance, the 0.54 value corresponding to home production for households in the bottom quintile (Q1) indicates that the average value of home production represents 54% of the total value of social reproduction flows (or the sum of the monetary value of paid work, home production, and social benefits). Tables S3-S6 in the appendix contain the monetary value assigned to each flow as well as the components, such as pensions, private and public health expenditures, education, and other measures.

**Table 2.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Household Production	Average	0.54	0.48	0.44	0.43	0.32	0.62	0.51	0.43	0.40	0.28
	% change	-28.95	-23.21	-19.54	-20.35	-26.13	-1.97	10.99	21.47	10.55	3.68
Paid Work	Average	0.08	0.28	0.43	0.49	0.63	0.05	0.16	0.31	0.41	0.58
	% change	28.18	10.21	-1.64	5.11	9.35	48.39	-44.59	-31.06	-4.62	6.75
Social Benefits*	Average	0.39	0.24	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.34	0.33	0.26	0.20	0.14
	% change	59.65	58.52	157.02	215.09	137.16	-3.10	27.90	18.23	-8.89	-25.06

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: The US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because average general benefit amounts are small.

The analyses show that differences in social reproduction by household income are generally similar in both countries, albeit with some important inter-country contrasts. In both countries, we see that for low-income and lower-middle-income households (Q1 and Q2), home production contributes the most, an average of nearly 54% and 48% in the United States, respectively, and 62% and 51% in the United Kingdom, respectively, over the time studied. For low-income households in both countries, public benefits contribute a substantially larger share than paid work—39% social benefits versus 8% paid work in the United States and 34% social benefits versus 5% paid work in the United Kingdom. This reflects the inadequacy of low wages in both countries, and how the welfare state is an important part of the social reproduction of the lowest income households.

Middle-income households (Q3) in the United States and United Kingdom are also heavily dependent on home production: it contributes an average of 44% in the United States and 43% in the United Kingdom over the time studied. But the two countries diverge in the extent to which these middle-income households rely on paid work and social benefits. In the United States, paid work represents 43% of the total value of social reproduction and social benefits represent only 12%. By contrast, in the United Kingdom, paid work for middle-income households represents 31% and social benefits 26%. This difference in the relative contribution of social benefits and paid work for middle-income households is one indication of the divergence between the two welfare regimes.

Upper-middle-income (Q4) and high-income (Q5) households display similar patterns in both countries, although inter-country distinctions emerge here as well. Only in these higher-earning

income groups does paid work contribute the largest share to household social reproduction. In the United States, wages and benefits contribute a larger share to household social reproduction, an average of 49% for upper-middle-income households and 63% for high-income households. In the United Kingdom, the share of paid work is smaller, with 41% for upper-middle-income and 58% for high-income households. Social benefits contribute the smallest share to the two higher-income groups' social reproduction, but it is not negligible. This is especially true in the United Kingdom, where it represents an average of 20% and 14% for upper-middle-income and high-income households, respectively. In the United States, social benefits contribute substantially less to these income groups than in the United Kingdom—only 8% to upper-middle-income and 6% to high-income households. This divergence is largely due to healthcare provisioning—a finding that continues to be observable over time in our analysis.

### **3.1 Transformations in the Socioeconomic Organization of Social Reproduction over Four Decades**


Have macro-level transformations caused social reproduction to be universally refamilialized, marketized, or desocialized? Figure 1 plots households' reliance on the three flows of social reproduction by household income and decade. Table 2 displays the overall percentage change over the study period as a synthetic measure. Our analyses reveal important inter-country differences that reflect the underlying welfare state models. Our findings also demonstrate distinct patterns in transformations of the organization of social reproduction for different socioeconomic groups.



**Figure 1. Social Reproduction Flows by Household Income Quintile, 1970s to 2010s.**  
**Panel A. United States**



**Panel B. UK**



Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

While the role of home production shifted in markedly different ways in the United States and the United Kingdom during the study period, we do not find evidence of universal

refamilialization of social reproduction in either country. In the United States, all household income groups experienced reductions in the share of home production, a result of a combination of declines in time spent on home production and wage stagnation. By contrast, in the United Kingdom the share of home production did not experience the same uniform decrease, although time spent on home production also declined. This is because average wages in the United Kingdom grew over this period, thus offsetting reduced time investments in home production.

The two countries also show divergence in how the role of paid work in social reproduction shifted over the past four decades, implying that some socioeconomic groups experienced further marketization of social reproduction, while others did not. In the United States, reliance on paid work increased for all household income groups except for middle-income households (Q3), while in the United Kingdom reliance on paid work decreased for most household income groups except for the bottom and top household income groups. Examining the components of paid work reveals that employer-based benefits, rather than wages, are key to explaining these divergent trajectories in paid work's contribution to social reproduction.

While the importance of paid work grew for some socioeconomic groups, the source of this growth reflects wage inequality. In the United States, employer-provided healthcare and pensions played a major role in driving increases in the share of paid work for all household income groups, while increases in earnings played only a modest role for most household income groups except for the top earners (see Appendix Table S5 for details). In the United Kingdom, by contrast, changes in paid work were driven by dissimilar shifts in earnings and employer-based benefits across household income groups. Low-income households (Q1), for

instance, saw increases in earnings and employer-based pension contributions that increased paid work's share of total social reproduction. Lower-middle-income and middle-income households (Q2 and Q3), however, saw decreases in paid work contributions driven by decreases in earnings that outweighed the increases in employer-based pension contributions. Higher income households (Q4 and Q5) experienced relatively smaller changes in the share of paid work. Both groups saw increases in earnings and employer-provided pensions in absolute terms. For upper-middle-income households these changes were very small and shadowed by the increased share of home production driven by average wage growth. For high-income households the increases in earnings were more substantial and resulted in paid work representing a higher share of total reproduction over this period (see Appendix Table S5 for details).

While changes in the share of social benefits relative to the other main components of social reproduction display important contrasts between the United States and United Kingdom, we do not find evidence of universal desocialization of household social reproduction in either country. In the United States, all income groups experienced an increased share of social benefits, which was larger for the top three income groups (Q3–Q5). In the United Kingdom, the middle three household income groups (Q2–Q4) experienced an increase in the relative reliance on social benefits, while those on the tails experienced decreases. However, when measured in absolute terms, all household income groups in the United States and United Kingdom experienced increases in social benefits. In the United States, these increases were driven by public spending on education and health. In the United Kingdom, they were driven by

increases in most social benefits, except for public spending on education, which declined over this period.

The different shifts in the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction in the two countries reflect similarity and dissimilarity in the United States and United Kingdom socioeconomic organization of social reproduction. The welfare state literature describes both countries as market-oriented, as they emphasize the importance of paid work. However, we also see distinct patterns between the two country's social welfare provisioning, which Walby (2020) describes as the difference between a "neoliberal" model in the United States versus "a mix of neoliberal and social democratic" in the United Kingdom. Our findings support the claim that the United Kingdom is more redistributive across the income gradient than the United States. However, state support remains an important part of social reproduction in both countries, even as benefits are tied to labor force participation.

The difference in healthcare models is particularly important to explaining how the role of paid work and social benefits evolved over time in the two countries. In the United States, with its private-public healthcare model, growing healthcare costs contribute to increases in paid work (via employer-provided healthcare) and in social benefits for low-income households and households with older adults.<sup>9</sup> By contrast, the United Kingdom's National Health Service (NHS) is universal and translates into increases in social benefits for all household income groups.

The other important driver of inter-country differences relates to the dynamics of aging, which manifests as increased spending on pensions and healthcare. In the United States, employer-provided pensions have increased more than government spending on pensions, while in the

United Kingdom both have experienced remarkable growth, although this growth has been more pronounced for higher-income households.

### 3.2 Women’s Share of Household Social Reproduction

Next, we focus on the gendered dynamics of the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction, which has been previously underexplored due to data limitations. Table 3 shows women’s average contribution to each social reproduction component as well as women’s average contribution to total household social reproduction over the study period.

**Table 3.** Women’s Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social	Average	0.69	0.59	0.53	0.46	0.43	0.72	0.62	0.52	0.45	0.42
Reproduction	% change	-11.89	-6.47	0.00	11.66	0.71	-18.40	4.76	15.12	11.96	8.71
Household	Average	0.74	0.68	0.67	0.56	0.65	0.78	0.73	0.67	0.57	0.64
Production	% change	-8.90	-8.21	-12.45	-5.44	-13.62	-22.95	-17.87	-16.43	-7.89	-16.84
Paid Work	Average	0.53	0.47	0.40	0.36	0.31	0.56	0.39	0.31	0.31	0.29
	% change	3.48	16.73	50.42	64.32	46.45	10.62	89.25	100.1	60.13	61.16
Social Benefits*	Average	0.66	0.53	0.48	0.45	0.42	0.64	0.57	0.52	0.50	0.49
	% change	-9.26	1.62	-2.75	-5.76	-12.97	-10.28	7.59	10.91	5.94	1.01

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: The US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because the general benefits amounts is small.

A key finding of our analysis is that women’s responsibility for social reproduction varies by socioeconomic group and that these patterns are strikingly similar in the two countries. We find that the lower a woman’s socioeconomic status, the greater her contribution to her household’s overall social reproduction, along with each of the main flows—household

production, paid work, and receipt of social benefits. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) contributed an average of 69% in the United States and 72% in the United Kingdom to their households' overall social reproduction. For this group, the important role of women's contribution reflects the importance of home production but also women's contributions to paid work and social benefits. In both countries, as household income increases, women's share of overall social reproduction declines, largely because women contribute less to paid work than their high-earning partners—but also because they contribute relatively smaller shares of home production and social benefits as well.

The relative contribution of women's home production is key to understanding the socioeconomic discrepancy in women's overall share of household social reproduction. While women's share of home production is above 50% across all household income groups in both countries, this share declines as household income increases. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) performed 74% and 78% of home production in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. Women in middle-income households performed 67% of household production in both countries, and women in high-income households (Q5) contributed 65% and 64% of home production in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. The fact that women in higher-income households appear closest to achieving an equitable distribution reflects higher involvement in home production by men compared to lower-income households. See Appendix Table S8 for details.

Compared to home production, women's contribution to paid work is smaller but substantial across all household income groups. Women's relative contributions to household social

reproduction through paid work are greater for lower-income households than in higher-income households in both countries. For instance, women in lower-income households contributed more than half of their household's total paid work—53% in the United States and 56% in the United Kingdom—while women across all other income groups contributed less than 50% in both countries, with contributions ranging from 47% to 29%. This household income gradient reflects both gender differences in time investments in paid work and gender earnings differentials, both being larger for higher income households compared to lower income households in the two countries. See Appendix S9 for more details.

Women's share of social benefits follows the same household income gradient pattern as all other social reproduction flows—with women's contributions being higher for lower-income than in higher-income households in both countries. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) received 66% and 64% of their households' social benefits in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, while women in upper-middle-income households (Q4) received 45% and 50%, respectively. There are two main reasons why women in lower-income households receive a larger share of household social benefits than their more affluent counterparts. First, there are more female-headed households—typically single mothers—among lower-income groups. This affects not only eligibility for social programs, but also how we calculated male and female shares of household social benefits.<sup>10</sup> The second reason is that women in lower-income and lower-middle-income households have higher rates of labor force participation, which makes them eligible for more in-work government benefits such as tax credits, unemployment insurance, and public pensions. As both countries have shifted welfare


provision toward in-work benefits, access to the social benefits is increasingly a function of labor force attachment.

### 3.3 Transformations in the Gendered Organization of Social Reproduction over Four Decades

Have macro-level transformations degendered the social reproduction of labor power? To examine this question, Figure 2 plots women’s share of paid work, home production, social benefits, and total social reproduction by household income and decade. Table 3 displays the overall percentage change in each of these measures over the study period as a synthetic measure.


**Figure 2.** Women’s Share of Reproduction Flows by Household Income Quintile, 1970s to 2010s.

**Panel A.** United States





**Panel B. United Kingdom**



Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Both countries have seen movement toward gender parity in household social reproduction, but the processes undergirding this transformation vary substantively across household income groups. Women in lower-income households have seen a decline in their share of social reproduction, which was above 50% at the beginning of the study period. For instance, in the United States, women’s share of social reproduction declined from 74% to 65% and from 62% to 58% for the low and lower-middle income groups (Q1 and Q2). This decline is the result of important reductions in women’s share of home production and small increases in women’s share of paid work, which were near parity at the beginning of the period for these groups. The changes in lower-income women’s share of social benefits are generally smaller. By contrast, women from higher-income households have seen smaller changes and in the opposite

direction, albeit also toward parity. In these groups, women's share of social reproduction was below 50% at the beginning of the period and increased over the study period. For instance, in the United Kingdom, women's share of social reproduction increased from 43% to 48% and from 41% to 45% for the upper-middle and high-income groups (Q4 and Q5). These increases are largely derived from large increases in higher-income women's share of paid work that offset the declines in their share of home production.

There are two revealing exceptions to this pattern of movement toward gender parity in women's contribution to household social reproduction. In the United Kingdom, the lower-middle and middle-income groups (Q2 and Q3) experienced increases in women's share of social reproduction. This occurred despite the fact that these groups of women already contributed nearly or over half of social reproduction at the beginning of this period. This suggests that in the United Kingdom, there has been an intensification of lower-middle and middle-income women's responsibility for social reproduction that departs from gender parity.

An alternative way to evaluate the extent that social reproduction is being degendered is to examine the shifting relationship between the most gendered components of social reproduction—home production and paid work. The greater the distance between women's share of home production and paid work, the more economically specialized their economic contributions to social reproduction. At the beginning of the period the distance between women's share of home production and paid work was generally greater in higher income households in both countries. For instance, in the United States in 1973, the difference between women's share of home production and paid work was 27 and 47 percentage points

for the lowest (Q1) and highest income (Q5) households, respectively. In the United Kingdom, in 1973 the difference between home production and paid work was 39 and 51 percentage points for Q1 and Q5, respectively. Over time, this distance has narrowed for all groups in both countries, indicating declining economic specialization by gender. In the United Kingdom, the narrowing of this distance does not follow a specific pattern by income group: all groups have seen declines in this distance, ranging between 19 and 37 percentage points. In the United States, however, the narrowing of this distance is greater for higher income households. For instance, the lowest income group had a decline in the distance between women's share of home production and paid work of 9 percentage points (from 27 to 19), whereas the highest income group's decline was 20 percentage points (from 47 to 27).

### **3.4 Changes in Women's Contribution by Component**

Both countries have seen declines in women's share of home production, which reflect increases in men's and declines in women's time spent on home production across all household income groups. Yet, women still do the bulk of household production in all income groups in both countries.

Women's share of paid work increased across all household income groups in both the United States and the United Kingdom. However, the household income groups that experienced more change are somewhat different in the two countries. In the United States, the increase in women's share of paid work is more pronounced as household income increases, except for high-income households (Q5), which show a smaller increase in women's share of paid work than the upper-middle-income household (Q4) group. In the United Kingdom, the increase in

women's share of paid work follows an inverted U-shape, with increases being largest for middle-income household groups (Q2–Q4) than in the tails.

The relative increase of women's contribution to household social reproduction through paid work should be understood in the context of the gendered implications of growing income inequality. While women's earnings increased among all income groups, this was not the case for men. In fact, households with the lowest and highest incomes (Q1 and Q5) experienced an increase in men's earnings, whereas middle-income men's incomes declined. We therefore urge caution in celebrating the substantial growth in middle-income women's contributions to household social reproduction through paid work, as this is the result of a decline in middle-income men's wages. In addition, increases in women's pensions relative to men's contributed to this growth.

Changes in women's share of social benefits demonstrate that the state's role in social reproduction has a gendered and socioeconomic dimension. In the United States, women's share of social benefits declined for all household income groups, except for the low-middle income group (Q2). The components driving this decline differ by income group.<sup>11</sup> For low-income households (Q1), these shifts are due to increases in general benefits that benefit more men than women. For higher-income households (Q3–Q5), the main driver of the decline in women's share of social benefits were increases in contributory pensions that benefit men relatively more than women. In the United Kingdom, women's share of social benefits declined for low-income households (Q1) and increased for all other income groups (Q2–Q5). Increases

in family benefits that are received by more women than men were an important driver of the increase in women's share of social benefits for income groups Q2–Q5.

#### **4. Discussion**

Despite significant macro-level transformations that occurred in the institutional domain of the economy in both the United States and the United Kingdom between 1979 and 2013, we do not find evidence that social reproduction has been universally refamilialized, marketized, or desocialized. The system of social reproduction is highly stratified, which explains why uniform changes have not occurred. Our findings support the argument in Bakker and Gill (2019, 504) that the impact of neoliberalism on social reproduction will be “uneven and variegated.” While our findings do imply that household social reproduction has experienced some degendering, the socioeconomic patterns and feminist implications of these results are ambiguous.

##### **4.1 Refamilialization**

Neoliberal ideology and economic policy rely on the institution of the nuclear family (Cooper 2017). SRT literature has implied that policy changes brought on by neoliberalism would lead to a refamilialization of social reproduction (Bezanson and Luxton 2006). Yet, our results do not demonstrate universal growth in the contribution of unpaid household production to social reproduction. Instead, we see overall reductions in the relative contribution of household production in the United States, and only modest increases in the United Kingdom, driven by growth in average wages. Overall, hours of household production have declined. These results may be more consistent with the description in Rai et al. (2014) that to mitigate the harm of

neoliberalism on social reproduction, individuals and households may find strategies that include using labor-saving technologies, purchasing substitutes, or sharing care responsibilities.

There are various reasons for a decrease in household production in both relative and absolute terms. In many cases, increased labor force participation of women has necessitated reductions in household production. Long commutes and the administrative burden of receiving public benefits are also time-consuming. Persistent gender norms have meant that men have increased their hours of household production, but not enough to offset women's decrease. Why men's household production has not increased more is an important social and political question, shaped by constraints, norms, and policy. Social relations, gender norms, and power imbalances between men and women are at the core of the women's undue burden for household production, even as their hours of paid work rise (Cooke 2011).

Another important factor during this period were expansions in ownership of household appliances as well as for markets for substitutes for a wide range of goods and services consumed by households. While some of these services such as nannies and cleaning services are only accessible to higher-income families, other substitutes such as fast food are inexpensive and widely available. It is important to note that these individual-level strategies link macro-level gender and socioeconomic transformations, as one woman's purchased substitute for household production is another woman's paid work.

The growing reliance on paid substitutes highlights intersectional inequalities underlying changes in social reproduction, as well as capitalist responses to pressures put on the household. Our period of study occurred before the digital "platform economy" made its foray

into the domestic and care sector. As Rodríguez-Modroño et al. (2022) have argued, the platform economy in the Global North relies on precariously employed migrant women from the Global South who lack social protections and benefits. While the hiring of migrant women for domestic care services is not new (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2004), we now see the expansion of these sectors through greater financial investment of technology firms.

#### **4.2 Marketization**

Since the 1980s, political discourse in both the United States and United Kingdom has emphasized the importance of relying on employment, implying that there were efforts to further marketize social reproduction over this period. As Korpi (2000) and Lewis (2001) have argued, policy changes in the neoliberal era have attempted to make paid work obligatory for adults—even older people and single mothers. Yet, we do not see evidence that social reproduction has been further marketized for all groups. Instead, our findings support the argument by Bakker and Gill (2019, 503) that “the neoliberalization and commodification of social reproduction remains incomplete and not all-encompassing or determinant.” Some groups have seen increased reliance on paid work, while others have experienced the opposite. Importantly, the growth in the relative contribution of paid work was largely driven by increased costs of employer-based benefits such as pensions and, in the United States, health insurance.

There are various reasons that increased marketization has not occurred universally. First, it is important to note that the universal marketization of social reproduction is a misconception.

While low-income households have high rates of labor force participation, paid work

contributes the least to their household social reproduction due to low wages. In both countries, the lower a household's socioeconomic status, the smaller is the overall contribution of paid work and the greater importance of household production and social benefits. As Moos (2021) also demonstrates, household production makes greater contributions to household social reproduction than wages or employer-based benefits for all but the highest earning households.

Another reason for the uneven growth of the importance of paid work is the lackluster or negative growth of real wages. Wage stagnation has been more pronounced in the United States than the United Kingdom, reflecting a different economic trajectory since the 1970s. Yet, the importance of paid work has grown more in the United States than the United Kingdom because of the reliance on employer-sponsored health insurance and the growing cost of healthcare. This puts workers in the United States at increased vulnerability, even after the Affordable Care Act of 2010. As healthcare costs rise, more of the costs are pushed onto workers through high deductible plans. This means that healthcare both represents a bigger portion of an employer's wage bill and eats up a greater share of a household's earned income. In the United Kingdom, the NHS continues to suffer from chronic underfunding, but has proven resilient to complete privatization so far. While the use of private insurance in the United Kingdom has increased since our study, it does not amount to a major shift in the responsibility for health insurance from the state to employers.



### 4.3 Desocialization

While there is little dispute that neoliberalism has led to a deterioration of the quality and quantity of public services in both countries—often with devastating effects for human well-being—social reproduction has not been universally desocialized. In the United States, the actual share of the state’s role in public goods provision has risen during our period of study for all income groups. In the United Kingdom, the share of social benefits contribution to social reproduction has risen for lower-middle-income and middle-income households. Research employing the LIMEW also finds that government expenditures have grown in importance amid economic inequality in both countries during this time. Zacharias et al. (2018) found that in the United States between 2000 and 2013, there was growing dependence on government support to offset losses in earned income. Eren et al. (2011) found that gains for middle-class households in Great Britain between 1995 and 2005 were largely the result of increased government spending.

Our findings support the arguments of other SRT authors such as Moos (2021, 2019) and Mohandesi and Teitelman (2017), that neoliberalism has had a contradictory and conflicting influence of the state’s role in social reproduction. As Kunz (2010, 915) argues, contrary to the “re-privatization of social reproduction thesis,” neoliberalism often brings “changing forms of state involvement” rather than a straightforward retreat of the state. Bakker and Gill (2019, 512–13) describe this as “fragmentary neoliberalism” resulting from ambivalence toward the contradictions created by capital accumulation’s effect on social reproduction.

While the two countries have shared similar rhetorical and policy aims in the neoliberal era, the actual experience is strongly influenced by differences in the underlying welfare state model and how policy reforms have evolved in the context of previously determined social commitments from the state. In terms of state provisioning, the United Kingdom model can still be interpreted as a less extreme version of the neoliberal model than the model used in the United States. There continues to be greater universalism in social provisioning in the United Kingdom—even as there have been observable losses caused by austerity, particularly for education expenditures. Although known for its stinginess, the United States welfare state contains significant fiscal commitments to older Americans and automatic countercyclical programs for workers in times of economic downturn. For this reason, there has been an increased role in the United States of the state in social reproduction during our period of study, which includes several recessionary periods. Our findings support the argument made by Moos (2019) that in the United States, social spending for the working-class net of taxation has expanded during the neoliberal era due to rising healthcare costs and aging, as well as economic crisis and precarity.

While we do not see evidence of universal desocialization, the vulnerability caused by the withdrawal of state support for social reproduction is still of grave concern. Austerity measures in the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2019 have been linked to increasing death rates among the poor, especially for women, even before the Covid-19 pandemic (Walsh et al. 2022). In the United States, state-level expenditures, which provide essential health, education, and social services funding, are especially vulnerable to cuts and misallocation (Bittle 2020). While there were expansions in government social spending during the Covid-19 crisis in both

countries, this support has dwindled. Furthermore, aging populations increase fiscal pressures on social insurance programs, which can make commitments to the social reproduction of the previous generations politically vulnerable.<sup>12</sup> Reductions in state spending on the elderly—or reductions in traditional pensions from employers—will have major implications on the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction.

#### **4.4 Degendering**

Our results suggest that women's share of total social reproduction across household income groups becomes slightly more gender egalitarian in both countries over the four decades. We present two measures of degendering: women's contribution to total household social reproduction and the distance between their shares of paid and unpaid work. Both appear to be moving toward parity for the most household groups in both countries.

While both measures of degendering imply that progress is being made toward gender parity in social reproduction, they tell opposite stories when socioeconomic status is considered. By focusing on women's contribution to total household social reproduction, one could conclude that lower-income women are experiencing greater change toward degendering. Lower-income women began more inegalitarian in the 1970s but by 2013 appeared more egalitarian than their higher-income counterparts. However, measuring the distance between paid and unpaid work indicates that higher-income women made more progress toward de-specialization in household production in the United States, while in the United Kingdom progress is more even among income groups. The United States trend for this measure implies that higher-income women began more inegalitarian in the 1970s but were more egalitarian at the end of the

series. We interpret the discrepancy between the results of these two measures as reflecting the complexity of the relationship between gender and class, which our quantitative analysis uncovers but cannot fully illuminate. Further research is necessary to answer the question of which socioeconomic groups of women are experiencing greater degendering of household social reproduction, and why.

While these findings suggest a reduction in the difference in women's contributions relative to men, we urge caution in interpreting our results as evidence of an equalization of gendered responsibilities for social reproduction in either country. As Bloome et al. (2019) note, there are persistent "gender asymmetries" in the income attainment process between men and women.

Another interpretation is that our findings demonstrate the intensification of women's responsibilities for social reproduction during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Women are still responsible for the bulk of household production, even as their contributions through paid work have increased—a demonstration of the well-known "second shift" for women who work outside the home (Hochschild and Machung 2012). Political-economic as well as interpersonal hurdles curtail greater progress toward gender equality. Underinvestment in the public care sector, the gender wage gap, and labor market segmentation all result in women typically earning less than men—and often less than the cost of childcare. This can intensify women's need to work both outside and within the home to support household social reproduction.

Another reason why we urge caution in celebrating our findings is that we do not assume that paid work is *necessarily* emancipatory for women. While there are important benefits to labor

force participation for many women, it is consistent both with goals of liberal feminism and with capital's desire for a flexible, cheaper workforce (Newman 2013). During this period, both countries pursued policies intended to "activate" women workers, including single mothers, expanding the market for low-wage jobs by tying public benefits to labor force participation (Chanfreau 2023; Orloff 2002). This created numerous feedback effects that perpetuated inequality among women along socioeconomic and racial lines. As mentioned earlier, low-income women, particularly women of color and migrants, are often employed in low-wage jobs that supply market substitutes for home production. Furthermore, the expansion of women's labor force participation must be understood in context with a corresponding deterioration of job quality and of the male wage, particularly in the United States. We see this in our empirical results: women's relative contributions to social reproduction through paid work increased, as men's real wages declined. This created a feedback effect of more households relying on two adult earners.

Finally, degendering household social reproduction is likely a long and nonlinear process, requiring macro-level transformations in the domains of the economy, polity, and civil society. Progress with regard to a more equitable distribution of the responsibility for social reproduction may be vulnerable to social and economic crises—at the household, national, or global level—as the overreliance on women's paid and unpaid socially reproductive labor during the Covid-19 pandemic made clear (Stevano et al. 2021). Since our period of study, the public consciousness of the importance of unpaid caregiving has grown, but so have assaults on feminist gains due to populist politics and "culture wars" that aim to re-naturalize women's subordination and role in social reproduction.

## 5. Conclusion

Our analysis quantitatively measures the structure and transformation of the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction in the United States and the United Kingdom over four decades. This quantitative exercise illustrates the outcomes of a social stratification process where gender and class intersect—and the effect of macro-level transformations on transforming and maintaining the organization of social reproduction.

An interchange between gender regime theory and social reproduction theory has offered a useful theoretical framework for examining the organization of social reproduction within gender regimes. Rather than identifying the distribution of paid and unpaid work or women's labor force participation as final outcomes or focused exclusively on care provisioning, we have conceptualized the outcome of macro-level transformations as the material basis that structures households' ability to socially reproduce themselves.

Future research could explore the organization of social reproduction in diverse welfare and gender regimes. Our analysis of the United States and United Kingdom would be enriched by investigating whether the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction is demonstrably different in a more diverse set of welfare and gender regimes, particularly social democratic models. Furthermore, our analysis does not offer a normative view of how social reproduction *should* be organized between genders or institutions in an egalitarian society. This is an open question that could be pursued in future research, drawing on rich and diverse intellectual traditions in feminist scholarship.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Our materialist analysis of household social reproduction focuses primarily on the domain of the economy. However, this approach reproduces many shortcomings of political economy—in particular an abstraction from other institutional domains and a limited conceptualization of nations and states. Various authors have argued that GRT must better situate the family as a domain to address important social problems such as the rise of anti-gender campaigns within authoritarianism. Walby (2020) disagrees that “family” should be its own institutional domain, and instead should be dispersed among all others. Nevertheless, a more expansive consideration of social reproduction that interrogates the reproduction of ideologies, sexualities, and the family form would benefit from an interchange with GRT; however, this is beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> Various traditions exist within social reproduction research. For a useful genealogy, see Winders and Smith (2019). For critiques of contemporary SRT, including the focus on the reproduction of labor power which we adopt, see Rey-Araújo (2023).

<sup>3</sup> We use the LIS PPP deflators for 2011 USD. See <https://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/ppp-deflators/>.

<sup>4</sup> We do not include out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare, as these are paid out of individuals’ wages.

<sup>5</sup> Our main measure of home production only considers time spent on home production activities as a primary activity, which is the most conservative estimate. We do not use broader

measures that include secondary activities or activities with children in our main analyses because they are not consistently available for both countries in the period of analysis. Supplementary analyses with broader measures of home production are available in the Online Appendix.

<sup>6</sup> Average incomes are for 2013, computed in 2011 USD.

<sup>7</sup> The LIS and MTUS contain race/ethnicity data for the United States but not for the United Kingdom.

<sup>8</sup> Our estimates of household income and time spent on home production are consistent with published data. Benchmark details are available in the Online Appendix.

<sup>9</sup> The United States public sector only provides public health insurance for specific groups of people, concentrating on the elderly (Medicare program) and low-income populations (Medicaid program). The United States government also provides health insurance to public employees and healthcare to Veterans. The remainder of the population relies on employer-provided insurance, market insurances, or is uninsured.

<sup>10</sup> When a household did not contain an adult male, all social benefits were allocated to the female adults. See Appendix Table S1 Note 2 for more information.

<sup>11</sup> We divide social benefits into five categories: pensions, unemployment, general benefits, education, and health. General benefits include family benefits, sickness and work injury, disability, general assistance, housing benefits, public in-kind benefits, and other public programs not otherwise specified.



<sup>12</sup> In the United Kingdom, between 2010 and 2018, the state pension age for women rose from age 60 to 65, making it on par with men’s retirement age. It rose again to 66 for both men and women between 2018 and 2020. It will increase once more to 67 between 2026 and 2028. In the United States, concerns about the fiscal solvency of Social Security loom large and most analyst agree the program will require policy adjustments—which could be progressive or regressive—before 2035. While Medicare enjoys wide popularity, the program has also been slowly privatized, to the detriment of seniors’ health.

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## Online Appendix

### **Data preparation.**

Our study combines data from two separate harmonized individual-level datasets from population surveys (LIS and MTUS) and four aggregate-level data sources (OECD, UNESCO, FRED, and ONS). Below we describe the process we followed to merge these datasets.

Our main dataset is the LIS, which we use to calculate key quantities related to paid work and social benefits. We use the LIS to create a summary statistics dataset that contains the average quantities of each component of interest (i.e., labor earnings or unemployment benefits).

Averages are calculated for women and men in each household income quintiles group. The resulting data shows women's and men's averages by household income quintile, year and country.

Separately, we calculate a similar summary statistics dataset using the MTUS, estimating the average quantities of home production time for women and men in each household income quintile group. We merge the MTUS summary statistics dataset to the LIS summary statistics dataset by year, country, and household income quintile group. The result of this merge is a LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset.

The aggregate-level data sources are merged to our data in two ways. First, data on educational spending (UNESCO and FRED) as well as on health spending (OECD) are merged to the individual-level LIS data before creating the LIS summary statistics dataset. UNESCO and

FRED provide education spending per child and we use it to assign each specific household an education transfer based on how many school-aged children live in the household. For instance, if a household has three school aged children, this household is assigned three times the per-child educational spending corresponding to their country and year. These assignments are split by gender based on the sex distribution of the adults in the household. For instance, in a single-mother household with two children the value of women's educational transfer would equal two times the per child educational spending and the value for men's educational transfer in this household would be zero. Once these values have been assigned, we can calculate average educational transfers received in each household income quintile group, just like we calculate the average labor earnings or unemployment benefits.

The OECD health spending data is employed similarly and is also directly merged to the individual-level LIS dataset before creating the LIS summary statistics dataset. The OECD reports per capita values by country and year and we use it to assign each specific household a health transfer based on the number of residents in the household (including children and adults). For instance, a household with 5 individuals is assigned five times the per-capita health spending corresponding to their country and year. For the UK, this procedure is straightforward because everyone is covered under the National Health Service and we ignore the small percentage of people who purchase additional healthcare insurance. Thus, each household receives a per-capita spending of the National Health Service according to its size.

For the US, this same procedure introduces measurement error that is worth discussing. Since the OECD data only provides per-capita spending in private and public health insurance and the LIS

does not have measures indicating whether individuals receive public or private-employer based insurance, we are limited to assign household-specific private and public health transfers solely based on the household size, income, and age. Households that are below the federal poverty line, or have members who are 65+, receive shares of public health spending per capita. Households that are above the federal poverty line and do not have older members, receive corresponding shares of private health per capita spending. This overestimates health transfers for households in which individuals do not receive either public nor private health care based on this broad per-capita data. However, we are unable to improve on this measurement given the OECD and LIS data limitations.

In supplementary analyses with the US sample, discussed below, we substitute the OECD healthcare data with more detailed data provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). The benefit of this data is that per capita amounts are disaggregated by age and gender, allowing us to assign private healthcare amounts in a slightly more precise manner. The CMS estimates are still generous because we similarly assume that everyone who is under 65 and whose household income is above the federal poverty line is receiving private healthcare, thus assigning private insurance to uninsured individuals. Our general findings do not substantively change when we use the CMS data instead of the OECD data.

Lastly, the last two aggregate-level data sources provide, the BLS and ONS providing average wage data, are directly merged to the combined LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset. We use these values to assign monetary value to the average home production estimates by household income quintile included in the LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset. Results do not



significantly vary if we merge, instead, the average wage data to the MTUS individual-level dataset to compute household-specific monetary value of women’s and men’s home production and average these values.

**Benchmarks for key estimates.**

Our estimates of household income are consistent with published data. For instance, we estimate that the average household income in the third quintile in the US 1986 is \$50,537, and the FRED series data estimates that the median household income in that year is \$24,900 (in 1986 USD), which corresponds to \$51,100 after adjusting with the LIS 2011 PPP. We estimate that the average household income in the third quintile in the UK 2004 is \$34,743 and the median equivalized household income published by the UK Office of National Statistics for this year is £29,502 (in 2019 Pounds), which corresponds to \$37,497 after adjusting with the LIS 2011 PPP.

Our estimates of time spent in home production are also consistent with published data. We estimate that the average time spent on home production in the third quintile in the US in 1986 is 6.5 hours, and the Levy Institute reports that the average hours spent in housework in 1989 is 5.7 hours (2087/365).

**Benchmark 1: Household Income**

	Q3 Average Household Income	Median Household Income	
	(our data)	(published data)	(published data adjusted)
US 1986	50537	24900	51100
US 2013	54371	53590	51746
UK 2004	34748	29502	37497
UK 2013	34515	27875	35429

*Sources:* LIS, US Median Household Income from the FRED series data of the U.S. Census Bureau (URL: <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSA646N>), and UK Median Equivalised Household Income from the UK Office of National Statistics (<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/adhocs/11708timeseriesofmedianequivalisedhouseholdoriginalincomeforallindividuals1977tofinancialyearending2019ukfinancialyearending2019prices>).

*Notes:* Our data is in 2011 USD PPP. The US median household income estimates from the FRED are in current dollars and we use the LIS 2011 PPP deflators to convert it to 2011 USD PPP. The UK median household income estimates from the Office of National Statistics are in 2019 pounds and we use the LIS 2011 PPP deflator corresponding to the UK in 2019 to convert it to 2011 USD PPP. LIS 2011 PPP deflators can be found here: <https://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/ppp-deflators/>.

## Benchmark 2: Home Production

	Q3 Average Time Spent in Home Production (our data)		Time Spent in Home Production	
			(published data)	(published data adjusted)
US 1986	6.5	US 1989	2087	5.7
US 2004	6.7	US 2001	2030	5.6

*Sources:* US time spent on home production from Figure 2 in the Levy Institute May 2004 Report “Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being: United States, 1989, 1995, 2000, and 2001.” (URL: <https://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/limecw0504.pdf>).

*Notes:* The Levy Institute estimate reports annual median values of time spent in housework. We divide this quantity by 365 to obtain a comparable quantity to our daily estimate. The one-hour difference between estimates is likely due to differences in the activity codes used to obtain the two measures.

## Splitting household-level social benefits by gender.

Some of the LIS income transfer components we use to construct our social benefits measure are only measured at the household level and not at the individual level. To split these household-level transfer amounts by gender, we rely on the sex distribution of the adults in the household, which is equivalent to the procedure we use to assign school-aged children’s educational transfers by gender. For instance, in a household with two men, all household-level social benefit components would be assigned to men and the value for women’s social benefit components (as

well as any other component) is set to zero for this household. When the household includes both women and men, we split household-level social benefit components proportionally. For example, a household-level benefit such as a housing voucher in a household with three men and two women is split in the following way:  $3/5$  go to men and  $2/5$  go to women.

### **Supplementary analyses.**

We performed several sensitivity analyses to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to alternative operationalizations. We summarize the results below.

First, we included time-use data on secondary activity and on time spent with children as part of our measurement of home production. This analysis can only be done in a few survey years in which the data is available. Table S11 presents the results and shows that this broader definition of home production expectedly increases the size of home production but it does not change trends over time in refamilialization, marketization, desocialization or degendering.

Second, we valued our main measure of home production (based only on primary activity time-use data) at the minimum wage, instead of at the average wage, and we excluded social benefits not reported in the LIS (healthcare and education). Table S12 presents the results for this analysis. Imputing the value of home production using the minimum wage lowers the overall contribution of home production to household social reproduction, but does not change the trends we observe. Using this narrower operationalization of social reproduction increases inequality by income quintiles but it does not change our conclusions. The increased inequality is to be

expected because healthcare and education are received by most households regardless of their income position, and thus help to equalize the configuration of social reproduction resources.

Third, we analyzed US data substituting the OECD healthcare data for more detailed data from the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). The advantage of the CMS data is that it we can impute public and private health spending based on household income and its members' sex and age, whereas the OECD data only provides per capita amounts. Table S13 presents the results and shows that the more fine-grained healthcare spending data does not substantially change the results about the configuration or gendering of social reproduction resources.

Fourth, to examine the importance of racial stratification in the organization of social reproduction, we use US data and classify households by income tercile and by race group. We are unable to perform this analysis for the UK because the LIS and MTUS do not include consistent race or ethnicity information for the UK. The race variable used for this analysis distinguishes between households in which all members identify as "white" and households in which at least one of the members identifies as "non-white." Table S14 presents the results and shows that the configuration or gendering of social reproduction resources is similar between white and non-white households in the same income tercile and that the pattern of variation by income tercile is also similar for white and non-white households. This result does not mean that racial stratification does not play a role in shaping the configuration of social reproduction resources. One of the ways in which racial stratification very directly shapes the configuration of social reproduction resources is by placing a much larger share of nonwhite households in the

bottom income tercile than in the top tercile (between 40-45% of nonwhite households are in the bottom income tercile compared to about 30% of white households).

### **Supplementary Tables Outline.**

Table S1 describes sources used for each measure.

Table S2 describes the data availability from each data source.

Table S3-S6 provide more detailed information about the amounts and components for the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction.

Table S7-S10 provide more detailed information about the amounts and components for women's contributions to social reproduction.

Table S11-S14 report results for the supplementary analyses.

**Table S1.** Operationalization and Sources of Key Measures.

Measure	Definition	Components	Source (variable name)
Paid Work	Sum of labor income, private pensions income, and income value of per capita employer spending on healthcare, minus income taxes and social security contributions.	total labor income	LIS (pilabour)
		income from private pensions	LIS (pi33)
		income taxes and social security contributions	LIS (pxitsc)
		employer healthcare contributions per capita	OECD (voluntary healthexp)
Home Production	Average wages multiplied by the time spent on home production.	Time spent in home production as a primary activity	MTUS (see Note 1)
		Average wage	US: BLS, UK: ONS.
Social Benefits	Sum of income from public benefits, income from public contributory and non-contributory pensions, and income value of per capita public spending on healthcare.	income from public benefits	LIS (see Note 2)
		income from public non-contributory pensions	LIS (pi31)
		income from public contributory pensions	LIS (pi32)
		government public healthcare contributions per capita	OECD (compulsory healthexp)
		government public spending on education	UNESCO (UK) and FRED (US)

Note 1: The MTUS activities (codes) we use to identify time spent on home production are: food preparation and cooking (018), set table wash/put away dishes (019), cleaning (020), laundry ironing and clothing repair (021); maintain home/vehicle (022); other domestic work (023); purchase goods (024); pet care (027); physical and medical child care (028); teach and help with homework (029); read to, talk or play with child (030); supervise, accompany, other childcare (031); adult care (032), child/adult care travel (066); shop and household care travel (067). Our primary home production measure sums the time spent on all these activities as a primary activity. In supplementary analyses we construct two additional home production measures for years with more complete time diary data: a) time spent on home production as a primary and secondary activity, and b) time spent on home production as a primary and secondary activity plus time spent with children.

Note 2: The LIS income variables we use to identify social benefits are: parental leave (pi411), child allowance (hi412), unemployment (pi42), sickness and work injury benefits (pi43), disability benefits (pi44), general assistance (hi45), housing benefits (hi46), public in-kind benefits (hi47), and other benefits not captured by these categories but included in the general variable of public and social benefits (hipubsoc). Four of these variables are only available at the household level and not at the individual level (general assistance, housing benefits, public in-kind benefits, and amounts directly placed in hipubsoc). To include these values in gender-specific calculations we add up the total value of household-level public benefits variables and we distribute it to men and women evenly. For instance, in a household with the same number of adult men and women, half of these benefits are assigned to women and the other half to men, but in a household that only includes adult women, all the benefits are assigned to women.

**Table S2. Data Availability across Data Sources.**

		USA					UK				
		1974	1985	1995	2004	2013	1974	1987	1995	2005	2014
LIS	Total labor income (pilabour)										
	Private pensions (pi33)	NA									
	Income taxes and social security contributions (pxitsc)										
	Public non-contributory pensions (pi31)	NA									
	Public contributory pensions (pi32)	NA									
	Parental leave (pi411)	NA									
	Child allowance (hi412)	NA									
	Unemployment (pi42)										
	Sickness and work injury (pi43)	NA									
	Disability (pi44)	NA									
	General assistance (hi45)										
	Housing benefits (hi46)										
	Public in-kind benefits (hi47)										
	Other benefits (hipubsoc)										
MTUS	Home production	1975					1987			2014	
OECD/FRED	Healthcare per-capita spending		1986						2004		
UNESCO	Education per-child spending										
BLS/ONS	Average wages										

Note: Gray indicates data is available for the focal year of interest. NA indicates that data is not available for the focal year, and other cells indicate the year for which we draw data when data for the focal year is not available.

**Table S3.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social Reproduction	Average	59638	82279	102053	136252	183010	31504	45798	58253	75184	100725
	% change	17	11	9	3	17	78	62	57	53	70
Household Production	Average	31695	39477	45196	59016	57931	19483	23412	25229	30033	28106
	% change	-17	-14	-12	-18	-13	75	80	90	69	76
Paid Work	Average	4552	23073	44102	66752	114785	1498	7025	17516	30465	58544
	% change	50	23	7	8	28	164	-10	8	46	82
Social Benefits*	Average	23391	19730	12754	10484	10293	10524	15361	15509	14686	14074
	% change	86	77	181	225	179	73	107	85	39	28

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because the general benefits component is small.

**Table S4.** Components of Home Production, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Time	Average	4.62	5.76	6.59	8.60	8.44	4.68	5.63	6.04	7.30	6.82
	% change	-13.70	-10.85	-8.50	-14.44	-9.64	-6.90	-4.02	1.45	-10.07	-5.94
Wage	Average	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43
	% change	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.



**Table S5.** Components of Paid Work, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Earnings	Average	3980	19121	40008	67317	136882	932	6360	18875	35892	74458
	% change	26	2	-3	10	59	151	-39	-17	24	71
Taxes	Average	466	2663	6538	12762	36102	221	1373	4169	8228	19097
	% change	196	187	229	355	1006	35	-47	-27	13	72
Health	Average	660	5184	8787	10508	11678	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	776	270	172	170	180	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Pensions	Average	378	1431	1845	1689	2327	787	2037	2809	2801	3183
	% change	114	42	242	443	429	128	220	646	782	539

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

**Table S6.** Components of Social Benefits, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Pensions	Average	6163	7040	5587	4507	4575	4502	4388	2571	1511	917
	% change	18	18	41	50	41	4	104	297	199	97
Unemployment	Average	136	297	345	338	295	195	175	159	102	76
	% change	48	-6	9	22	49	505	244	113	56	24
General Benefits*	Average	1998	1858	1157	956	728	3144	4838	3688	2177	1458
	% change	-20	124	292	291	196	206	558	1005	550	354
Education	Average	748	1562	2069	2500	2713	620	2885	5193	6468	6734
	% change	242	362	299	256	282	-27	-42	-39	-46	-42
Health	Average	14306	8756	3448	2090	1858	2062	3075	3897	4427	4889
	% change	162	124	364	603	514	267	204	207	226	236

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: US is missing social benefits data for 1974, thus these quantities for the US are calculated for the period 1985-2014

**Table S7. Women’s Contribution to Social Reproduction, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.**

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her Social Reproduction	Average	40311	47631	53460	62203	77707	22442	28299	30349	34039	42298
	% change	15	16	14	18	21	45	70	80	71	85
His Social Reproduction	Average	18175	33081	47727	73465	104565	9063	17499	27905	41145	58427
	% change	74	37	14	-4	19	198	52	35	39	60
Her Household Production	Average	23405	27006	30280	33315	37541	14956	16760	16739	17052	17731
	% change	-25	-21	-23	-22	-25	35	48	59	55	47
His Household Production	Average	8290	12471	14916	25700	20390	4527	6652	8490	12981	10375
	% change	9	4	18	-12	15	384	223	195	89	156
Her Paid Work	Average	2376	10786	17453	24418	36147	832	2688	5448	9660	17619
	% change	64	51	64	79	89	192	70	116	133	193
His Paid Work	Average	2135	12069	26501	42241	78514	666	4338	12067	20805	40926
	% change	53	14	-14	-15	11	137	-37	-18	19	50
Her Social Benefits	Average	14529	9839	5727	4471	4019	6654	8851	8161	7328	6948
	% change	160	244	475	497	431	55	123	105	47	29
His Social Benefits	Average	7751	8541	6310	5524	5661	3870	6510	7347	7358	7127
	% change	242	232	508	567	588	107	89	66	31	26

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: US is missing general benefits and gender-specific pension data in 1974, thus social benefits are calculated for the period 1984-2014.

**Table S8.** Women's Contribution to Home Production, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Women's time	Average	3.41	3.93	4.41	4.85	5.47	3.67	4.09	4.07	4.17	4.38
	% change	-21.38	-18.17	-19.88	-19.10	-21.95	-28.26	-21.18	-15.21	-17.17	-21.78
Men's time	Average	1.21	1.82	2.18	3.75	2.98	1.01	1.54	1.97	3.13	2.44
	% change	13.55	8.32	22.47	-7.88	19.76	157.91	72.17	57.10	0.78	36.46
Wage	Average	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43
	% change	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

**Table S9.** Women’s Contribution to Paid Work, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her earnings	Average	2042	8647	14858	22850	40287	500	2427	5752	11247	22212
	% change	26	19	55	89	142	119	17	75	112	178
His earnings	Average	1938	10474	25151	44467	96595	432	3933	13123	24645	52247
	% change	25	-9	-24	-15	35	197	-57	-37	-1	41
Her Taxes	Average	229	1212	2467	4162	10408	116	509	1129	2257	5220
	% change	186	223	439	667	1425	39	-12	61	98	167
His Taxes	Average	237	1451	4071	8600	25693	105	864	3040	5971	13877
	% change	206	162	150	252	851	30	-59	-44	-7	47
Her Health	Average	362	2888	4567	5259	5706	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	712	261	169	172	188	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
His Health	Average	298	2296	4220	5248	5971	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	871	283	175	168	173	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Her Pensions*	Average	202	463	495	471	561	448	770	825	669	627
	% change	86	91	173	243	163	259	468	1060	726	886
His Pensions*	Average	136	750	1201	1125	1642	339	1268	1984	2132	2557
	% change	30	16	63	106	77	49	141	523	806	475

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: US is missing gender-specific pension data in 1974, thus pensions are calculated for the period 1984-2014.

**Table S10.** Women’s Contribution to Social Benefits, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her Pensions*	Average	3303	2811	2106	1587	1357	3001	2200	1246	744	457
	% change	11	24	53	70	81	7	108	268	182	71
His Pensions*	Average	1790	3096	2912	2523	2728	1501	2188	1325	768	459
	% change	31	13	33	39	25	-2	99	328	216	129
Her Unemployment	Average	59	105	121	108	113	53	46	57	36	27
	% change	95	47	112	70	93	4841	592	652	541	1081
His Unemployment	Average	77	192	224	230	183	143	129	102	66	49
	% change	25	-23	-23	5	26	308	153	55	21	-15
Her General Benefits*	Average	1524	1195	620	463	345	1906	3087	2124	1144	742
	% change	-31	128	457	435	264	123	566	1238	714	397
His General Benefits*	Average	474	663	537	493	383	1238	1751	1564	1033	716
	% change	28	118	185	209	149	466	544	752	414	316
Her Education	Average	518	917	1082	1260	1318	432	1766	2707	3208	3357
	% change	226	381	301	259	290	-33	-33	-33	-42	-40
His Education	Average	230	644	987	1241	1395	189	1120	2486	3260	3377
	% change	281	338	297	253	274	-10	-53	-45	-50	-44
Her Health	Average	9125	4810	1799	1053	887	1263	1752	2026	2196	2364
	% change	139	136	367	544	413	215	215	218	227	237
His Health	Average	5180	3946	1649	1038	971	799	1322	1871	2231	2525
	% change	206	111	360	670	641	371	190	196	226	235

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

\*Note: US is missing gender-specific pension data and general benefits in 1974, thus pensions and general benefits estimates are calculated for the period 1984-2014.

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**Table S11.** Sensitivity Analysis 1: Broader Measure of Home Production Including Secondary Activity and Time with Children Data.

**Panel A.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 2004-2013.

		US (Only primary activity data)					US (Adding Secondary and Time with Children Data)				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Household Production	Average	0.47	0.44	0.41	0.40	0.28	0.56	0.52	0.49	0.48	0.37
	% change	-4.92	-3.04	-2.23	-2.77	-1.98	-1.01	-1.09	-2.28	-1.77	-0.31
Paid Work	Average	0.09	0.30	0.44	0.50	0.65	0.07	0.25	0.38	0.43	0.57
	% change	-6.73	-7.40	-6.72	-2.77	-1.70	-9.69	-8.50	-6.08	-2.98	-2.30
Social Benefits	Average	0.44	0.26	0.15	0.10	0.07	0.36	0.22	0.13	0.09	0.06
	% change	7.05	15.10	29.90	28.95	28.05	3.65	13.73	30.79	28.67	27.27

**Panel B.** Women's Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 2004-2013.

		US (Only primary activity data)					US (Adding Secondary and Time with Children Data)				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social Reproduction	Average	0.66	0.58	0.52	0.47	0.42	0.67	0.59	0.53	0.48	0.43
	% change	-2.92	0.44	2.86	2.44	2.17	-2.63	0.52	2.77	2.17	1.76
Household Production	Average	0.72	0.67	0.63	0.55	0.62	0.71	0.65	0.62	0.54	0.59
	% change	-2.44	-0.47	1.95	0.70	-3.79	-2.47	-0.35	2.19	0.62	-3.44
Paid Work	Average	0.53	0.49	0.43	0.41	0.33	0.53	0.49	0.43	0.41	0.33
	% change	-0.40	0.72	4.16	5.27	7.29	-0.40	0.72	4.16	5.27	7.29
Social Benefits	Average	0.63	0.54	0.48	0.46	0.43	0.63	0.54	0.48	0.46	0.43
	% change	-3.38	2.59	2.57	-0.59	2.90	-3.38	2.59	2.57	-0.59	2.90

Source: LIS, MTUS, BLS, ONS.

Notes: Because secondary activity data is only available starting in 2004, we present results with our primary activity data for the period 2004-2013 for comparison.

**Table S12.** Sensitivity Analysis 2: Narrow Operationalization of Social Reproduction, Valuing Home Production at Minimum Wage and Excluding non-LIS public benefits.

**Panel A.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Household Production	Average	0.48	0.34	0.28	0.26	0.16
	% change	-14.22	-12.97	-10.07	-15.16	-24.91
Paid Work	Average	0.16	0.43	0.60	0.67	0.79
	% change	25.59	-4.23	-9.37	-2.71	3.29
Social Benefits	Average	0.35	0.23	0.12	0.07	0.04
	% change	12.11	34.01	116.38	158.49	70.74

**Panel B.** Women's Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social Reproduction	Average	0.68	0.54	0.46	0.40	0.36
	% change	-10.33	-2.00	15.15	29.25	15.40
Household Production	Average	0.74	0.68	0.67	0.56	0.65
	% change	-8.90	-8.21	-12.45	-5.44	-13.62
Paid Work	Average	0.52	0.45	0.37	0.34	0.30
	% change	2.71	15.30	55.55	70.56	46.67
Social Benefits	Average	0.69	0.52	0.44	0.40	0.37
	% change	-12.87	-5.59	-2.67	-4.25	-19.64

Source: LIS, MTUS, BLS, ONS.



**Table S13.** Sensitivity Analysis 3: Measuring Health Spending with CMS data in the US.

**Panel A.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 2004-2013.

		US (OECD data)					US (CMS data)				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Household Production	Average	0.47	0.44	0.41	0.40	0.28	0.52	0.48	0.43	0.42	0.29
	% change	-4.92	-3.04	-2.23	-2.77	-1.98	-0.74	-3.01	-2.69	-3.30	-2.35
Paid Work	Average	0.09	0.30	0.44	0.50	0.65	0.09	0.30	0.42	0.49	0.64
	% change	-6.73	-7.40	-6.72	-2.77	-1.70	-0.71	-5.95	-5.44	-1.75	-1.25
Social Benefits	Average	0.44	0.26	0.15	0.10	0.07	0.38	0.23	0.14	0.10	0.06
	% change	7.05	15.10	29.90	28.95	28.05	1.19	15.67	27.98	26.73	26.12

**Panel B.** Women's Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 2004-2013.

		US (OECD data)					US (CMS data)				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social Reproduction	Average	0.66	0.58	0.52	0.47	0.42	0.66	0.58	0.53	0.47	0.42
	% change	-2.92	0.44	2.86	2.44	2.17	-1.71	0.67	3.05	2.84	2.47
Household Production	Average	0.72	0.67	0.63	0.55	0.62	0.72	0.67	0.63	0.55	0.62
	% change	-2.44	-0.47	1.95	0.70	-3.79	-2.44	-0.47	1.95	0.70	-3.79
Paid Work	Average	0.53	0.49	0.43	0.41	0.33	0.54	0.50	0.44	0.41	0.33
	% change	-0.40	0.72	4.16	5.27	7.29	-0.02	1.48	5.28	6.57	8.36
Social Benefits	Average	0.63	0.54	0.48	0.46	0.43	0.61	0.52	0.48	0.45	0.42
	% change	-3.38	2.59	2.57	-0.59	2.90	-0.73	4.21	2.85	-0.10	3.49

Source: LIS, MTUS, BLS, ONS.

Notes: Because CMS data is only available starting in 2004, we present results with OECD data for the period 2004-2013 for comparison.

**Table S14.** Sensitivity Analysis 4: Examining Differences by Race and Income Group.

**Panel A.** Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					
		RQ01	RQ02	RQ03	RQ11	RQ12	RQ13
Household Production	Average	0.50	0.40	0.30	0.48	0.42	0.32
	% change	-27.18	-22.97	-27.56	-28.37	-20.21	-26.33
Paid Work	Average	0.15	0.45	0.63	0.16	0.46	0.62
	% change	11.90	-3.66	6.13	19.03	3.56	8.93
Social Benefits	Average	0.35	0.14	0.07	0.36	0.12	0.06
	% change	57.07	161.87	172.33	54.06	107.82	132.82

**Panel B.** Women's Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					
		RQ01	RQ02	RQ03	RQ11	RQ12	RQ13
Total Social Reproduction	Average	0.66	0.52	0.43	0.67	0.54	0.47
	% change	-13.46	0.27	4.68	-12.32	2.05	-2.56
Household Production	Average	0.74	0.68	0.65	0.75	0.68	0.66
	% change	-12.12	-11.68	-11.35	-12.26	-9.37	-11.62
Paid Work	Average	0.50	0.39	0.32	0.50	0.42	0.38
	% change	3.15	48.67	50.98	24.10	41.93	24.01
Social Benefits	Average	0.60	0.46	0.42	0.65	0.52	0.47
	% change	-3.53	0.68	-11.45	-12.76	-3.47	-12.35

Source: LIS, MTUS, BLS, ONS.

Notes: RQ01 = White bottom-income tercile, RQ02 = White middle-income tercile, RQ03 = White top-income tercile, RQ11 = Non-White bottom-income tercile, RQ12 = Non-White middle-income tercile, RQ13 = Non-White top-income tercile.