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Organization of Social Reproduction
in the Anglo-American Welfare Model:
Transformations in the US and UK
over Four Decades**

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The Socioeconomic and Gendered Organization of Social Reproduction in the Anglo-American Welfare Model: Transformations in the US and UK over Four Decades

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Abstract

Drawing on both gender regime theory and social reproduction theory, this paper employs survey data to offer a quantitative comparative analysis of the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction in the United States and United Kingdom from 1973 to 2013. Our analysis focuses on household production, paid work, and government social benefits to examine how men and women of different socioeconomic groups contribute to household social reproduction. We combine data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), the Multinational Time-Use Surveys (MTUS), and additional sources to construct an integrated dataset of harmonized household survey data. We find that household social reproduction in the US and UK reflect variations and path dependence within the Anglo-American model. While our results illustrate important shifts in the organization of social reproduction related to neoliberalism and feminism, we do not observe that social reproduction in either country has been fundamentally destabilized, refamiliarized, or degendered.

1 Introduction

In the United States and the United Kingdom—along with much of the advanced capitalist world—the late 20th and early 21st centuries were a time of social and economic transformation. Gender norms, labor relations, and standards of living all changed in profound ways. Welfare states—which structure gender relations by influencing the distribution of paid and unpaid work and by determining eligibility for state redistribution—experienced numerous expansions, contractions, and reforms. Gender regime theory (GRT), as developed by Walby (2020), provides a starting point to “deepen the feminist debates to better engage with macro-level transformations” (414). Walby (2020) argues that there is an “under-theorization of gender in macro accounts of social transformation” due to the “reduction of gender to either family or culture” (416). To theorize gender at the macro-level, it is necessary to cut through some of the traditional intellectual silos between research on the welfare state, family, and labor.

Social reproduction theory (SRT) offers a theoretical perspective— based on an integrated view of the economy which gives equal importance to market and non-market work—for analyzing the material foundations and gendered implications of macro-level transformations. Begun as a

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feminist intervention into classical political economy's narrow focus on production and relying heavily on definitions from Laslett and Brenner (1989),³ SRT emphasizes that labor power—the potential and capacity to work—is itself produced, or more accurately, *reproduced* primarily, but not exclusively, through unpaid labor which is disproportionately done by women (Bhattacharya 2017, Vogel 2013 [1983], Federici 2012). Rather than focus solely on household production, contemporary SRT is concerned with the “*internal and interactive relation*” between paid and unpaid work in capitalist societies (Ferguson 2020 p. 59). Feminist political economy has emphasized that social reproduction processes are made possible by the interaction between institutions such as the state, markets, households, and communities—all of which are influenced by gender relations (Bezanson and Luxton 2006, 3). While other frameworks have examined the interaction between paid and unpaid work to examine gender inequality, SRT integrates paid and unpaid work to interrogate political economy questions from a feminist perspective.

Drawing on both gender regime theory and social reproduction theory, our research is concerned with *how and to what extent* social and economic transformations have restructured the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction. Laslett and Brenner (1989) refer to “the organization of social reproduction” as pertaining to the institutions, strategies, and ideologies that make it possible for the work of social reproduction to be accomplished (p.383). The organization of social reproduction is an outcome of a social stratification process based on gender, class, and other forms of social difference. Prior work in feminist political economy has argued that “to shift the balance” of the work of social reproduction between institutions such as households and the state “is not neutral”—but instead has important political-economic causes and consequences (Benzanson and Luxton 2006, 7). Fraser (2016) refers to the politically contentious historical processes that re-organize social reproduction as “boundary struggles.”

Crucially, the organization—and re-organization—of social reproduction occurs within the context of a society's welfare state provisioning. Welfare state typologies that integrate a gender perspective, such as suggested by Korpi (2000), Lewis (2001), and Walby (2020), provide a system of classification of how different policy regimes interact with markets and families. This enables us to understand how different welfare states structure care provisioning and influence gender relations (Knijn and Kremer 1997, 332). The US and the UK are often grouped together in welfare state typologies—classified as liberal or Anglo-American models, despite important differences in social policy, most notably with regards to healthcare provision (Esping-Anderson 1990). Korpi (2000) classifies both countries as “market-oriented gender policy model” societies—ranking the US below the UK in terms of both general and dual-career family support from the state (p.147). Lewis (2001) describes the UK as relying on an “adult-

³ Laslett and Brenner (1989), write that “Among other things, social reproduction includes how food, clothing, and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, the ways in which the care and socialization of children are provided, the care of the infirm and elderly, and the social organization of sexuality. Social reproduction can thus be seen to include various kinds of work—mental, manual, and emotional—aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care necessary to maintain existing life and to reproduce the next generation” (p.383). This quotation is cited in Bhattacharya (2017, p.6-7) among other places.

worker family model”—emphasizing how American social welfare policy in the 1990s shaped the view in Britain that all adults had an obligation to engage in paid labor (p.159). Walby (2020) emphasizes the differences and similarities between the two countries, classifying the US as a “neoliberal gender regime” and the UK gender regime as “between neoliberal and social democratic.” For our purposes, we understand the US and UK as variants of the same model—which for shorthand we will refer to as the Anglo-American model—and will explore nuances between the two gender regimes.

An analysis of the gendered organization of social reproduction connects to, but also differs from, traditional feminist literature on the welfare state and gender. The dominant focus has been to examine how the welfare state does or does not enable gender parity in market and home production, identifying the outcome variable as women’s labor force participation or the distribution of paid and unpaid work within households. While insightful, we believe that this formulation obscures an important outcome of this social stratification process: the distribution of responsibility for labor’s social reproduction. Our interest is in institutions’ influence on the gendering of households’ income-generating and social reproduction processes. Instead of viewing women’s labor force participation or hours of household production as the final outcome of interest, we conceptualize the outcome of macro-level transformations as the material basis that structures households’ ability to socially reproduce themselves.

During our period of study, from 1973 to 2013, both labor and gender relations were transformed in the US and UK. The gender revolution, albeit unfinished, prompted an increase of women in the paid labor force, while largely maintaining their gendered roles and responsibilities regarding caregiving and family. Since the 1980s, the US and UK have pursued similar social and economic policies. Under the auspices of President Ronald Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK, the neoliberal revolution weakened labor protections, liberalized trade, and brought various policies that favored the interests of capital over labor. This led to stagnating wages for the working- and middle-classes and an explosion of top incomes in both countries, dramatically increasing economic inequality (Harvey 2007, 16-17). These policy changes had significant implications for gender equality both in the workplace and the home, with gains and setbacks occurring throughout this period (Newman 2013).

In the social reproduction literature, there is general agreement that neoliberalism has altered the distribution of responsibility for social reproduction, but key details about relevant changes remain unclear. Bezanson and Luxton (2006) study of the neoliberal turn in Canada in the 1990s, argue that cutting state services—such as early childhood education— increased women’s unpaid labor and caused an “individualization and refamiliarization of social reproduction” (p.9). Other scholars point to more nuanced shifts, noting that state involvement in social reproduction did not unequivocally decline. Mohandesi and Teitelman (2017) describe neoliberalism as a “two-pronged attack, involving the simultaneous expansion and retrenchment of the state...” which ultimately works to “...devolve the costs of social reproduction back onto the working class” (p.63). Moos (2021) argues that in the US, neoliberal policies have allowed employers to reduce their relative contribution to the social reproduction of the working class, contradictorily increasing the role of the state as well.

Existing gaps in understanding how social reproduction shifted since the 1970s are partly due to empirical limitations. The social reproduction literature has typically relied on historical analysis and aggregated data that analyze the implications of social and policy changes from a critical feminist perspective. However, the typical methods employed do not adequately evaluate the effect on changes on individuals and households. Studies claiming that neoliberalism has destabilized or led to a refamiliarization of social reproduction have not examined individual-level data on household production or receipt of government social benefits. Similarly, aggregated data has not provided a detailed analysis about gendered shifts in the organization of social reproduction and its intersection with social class. While Moos (2021) offered an innovative use of aggregate data to analyze shifts in social reproduction among class categories, she was not able to study the gender dimension. These empirical gaps have left open fundamental questions about the extent to which social reproduction has been destabilized, refamiliarized, or degendered.

Our study brings individual-level survey data to address these open questions and examine the structure and transformations of the US and UK gender regime models from the perspective of social reproduction theory. We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the Multinational Time-Use Surveys (MTUS) to construct an integrated dataset of harmonized household survey data on earned income, social benefits, and unpaid household production. This dataset is further complemented with data on public and private health spending from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Statistics), as well as public education expenditures data from the United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED). This novel dataset allows us to quantify the contributions of men and women of different socioeconomic quintiles to household social reproduction through paid work (which garners labor income and employer-based benefits), unpaid household production (which provides goods and services produced and consumed within the household), and the receipt of government-funded social benefits (both cash and in-kind). The comparative focus on the US and UK aims to illuminate similar and divergent patterns of the effects of macro-level transformations on the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction.

Leveraging this data, we provide a novel description about the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction by gender and by household quintile. The analyses address two key sets of questions. First, how did neoliberalism and feminism shift the organization of social reproduction for households of different income levels? In other words, to what extent do we see changes in households' reliance on paid work, unpaid work, and social benefits? Second, how did these shifts impact the gendered organization of social reproduction? Or, to what extent do we see women's responsibility for paid work, unpaid work, and social benefits grow or decline? The retrenchment approach would expect neoliberalism to increase unpaid work and stall or exacerbate gender inequality, particularly for lower income households. The alternative approach highlights complex and contradictory changes that do not unequivocally lead to increased home production or reduced social benefits.

Our empirical findings contribute important insights to both the GRT and SRT literatures. We expand upon the SRT literature by bringing a comparative quantitative analysis, thereby diversifying the methodological breath of the field. Survey micro data allows us to analyze how policy transformations have affected the behavior of households and distinguish between men and women’s contributions, adding a gendered analysis to the class-based analysis in Moos (2021). To the gender and welfare regime literature, our contribution is analyzing gender as a macro frame, not gender inequality in a singular dimension. Using this framework, we find that the socioeconomic organization of household social reproduction in the US and UK reflect nuances within the Anglo-American model and their divergent experiences with neoliberalism. On the other hand, the gendered organization of social reproduction in the two countries are nearly identical, reflecting their shared characteristics and similar experiences with feminism. While our results indicate that there have been important shifts in the organization of social reproduction related to neoliberal policy changes and feminist movements, we do not observe that social reproduction in either country has been fundamentally destabilized, refamiliarized, or degendered. We argue that the effect of the macro-level transformations we observe in both countries are strongly influenced by path dependence of each gender regime model. Path dependency has maintained the importance of social benefits while increased inequality has changed patterns of paid work and home production.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our data sources and methods. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 discusses how the structure and transformation of the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction relate to the neoliberal and feminist movements in both countries. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.

2 Data and Methods

We analyze social reproduction in material terms—measured as the total command over resources that a household has access to and employs to socially reproduce its members. We conceive of the social reproduction of individuals and households as primarily relying on three flows: *labor income and employer-based benefits* (net of taxes) derived from participation in paid work, *consumer goods and services* provided through unpaid home production, as well as *cash and in-kind social benefits* that households receive from the state.⁴ We refer to these flows as paid work, home production, and social benefits respectively.

While not all performed in the market or exchanged for pay, we measure these resources in a common denomination—2011 USD dollars—to make them comparable. We measure these resources in PPP-adjusted prices to combine and compare them across time, which requires imputing a “price” for household production.⁵

⁴ This conceptualization does not fully capture the idea that social reproduction work and spending represent *investments*, an important perspective developed by Heintz (2019) and others.

⁵ We use the LIS PPP deflators for 2011 USD. See <https://www.lisdatacenter.org/resources/ppp-deflators/>

2.2 Data Sources

The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is our core data source, which we use to obtain information on households' labor and non-labor income. The LIS harmonizes nationally-representative surveys on income to enable cross-national comparative analyses. The LIS data for the US draws on the Current Population Survey March Supplement (1968-2013) and the data for the UK draws on the Family Expenditure Survey (1969-1991) and the Family Resources Survey (1994-2013). For both countries, the LIS includes comprehensive income information from all adults in the household, which allows us to create household-level measures as well as examine gender dynamics within households.

The Multinational Time-Use Study (MTUS) harmonizes nationally-representative time-use surveys which we use to obtain estimates about home production. The US MTUS data draws on a historical series of time-use surveys (1965-2001) and the American Time Use Survey (2003-2013), and the UK MTUS data draws on a series of independent time-use surveys (1965-2013).

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) health expenditures data collects information on healthcare spending of governments and individuals on private insurance. We use this data to estimate per capita spending by the US and UK governments, as well as spending by employers on private health insurance plans.⁶ We obtain public spending on K-12 education in the UK from the United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). For public spending on education in the US, we rely on the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).

2.3 Measures

Below we describe how we measure the three social reproduction flows of interest: paid work, home production, and social benefits. Appendix Table S1 provides more details about the construction of each of these measures.

Paid Work. Paid work includes all income from wage labor in a given year. More specifically, this measure is the sum of total income from labor and employer-based benefits minus income taxes and social security contributions. To construct this measure, we draw on LIS data on labor income, income from private pensions, income taxes, and social security contributions, and we use OECD data on private health plans to obtain estimates of average employer contributions to healthcare.

Home production. Home production represents the imputed monetary value of time investments in home production activities, including housework and care work (see Table S1 Note 1 for detailed activity codes). We use the MTUS to calculate average time spent on home

⁶ We do not include out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare, as these are paid out of individuals wages.

production⁷, annualize this measure to represent the full year, and merge this information to the LIS data. Next, we use average wages to assign monetary value to time investments in home production. For instance, the monetary value of two hours of housework is two times the average wage⁸. The use of average wages to assign value to home production is motivated by both substantial and practical considerations. Scholars remain divided on the appropriate approach to value home production (Moos 2021b). Nevertheless, assigning the minimum wage to home production is inadequate because it reflects the market devaluation of care and reproductive work. Additionally, harmonized wage data is difficult to obtain and average wages data is the only consistent measure covering the full period of interest. As a result, the average wage is the most apt approximation to the value of home production in this context.

Social benefits. Government social benefits include income from government transfers, including pensions and public healthcare programs. More specifically, this measure is the sum of public benefits (such as parental leave, child allowances, unemployment, sickness and work injury, disability, etc.), contributory and non-contributory pensions, and government spending on public healthcare insurance programs. To construct this measure, we draw on LIS data on public benefits income, OECD data for government spending on public healthcare plans, and UNESCO and FRED data on public education. See Table S1 for more information on how the OECD data is merged to the LIS.

We calculate amounts for the three flows of social reproduction at the household-level and by gender. Household-level measures represent the 2011 USD PPP value of households' annual flows coming from paid work, home production, and social benefits. For instance, a hypothetical household's social reproduction might be comprised of \$60,000 from paid work, \$40,000 from home production, and \$20,000 from social benefits, all adding up to \$120,000 representing the total value of social reproduction. Gender-specific measures indicate whether social reproduction flows come from women or men in the household. For instance, in the same hypothetical household men might bring \$50,000 from paid work, \$5,000 from home production, and \$10,000 from social benefits, while women bring \$10,000 from paid work, \$35,000 from home production, and \$10,000 from social benefits. Using gender-specific measures we can compute women's share of social reproduction flows. In the same hypothetical household, women bring in 17% of paid work, 87% of home production, 50% of

⁷ Our main measure of home production only considers time spent on home production activities as a primary activity, which is the most conservative estimate. In supplementary analyses, we added time spent on home production as a secondary activity and time spent with children while not engaged in home production as a primary or secondary activity. The latter measure has been used to capture supervisory care (Suh and Folbre 2016). We do not use these broader measures of time investments in home production in our main analyses because these measures are not consistently available for both countries in the period of analysis, but we refer to them to perform specific tests to evaluate whether including a broader definition of home production would change our conclusions.

⁸ US wage data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) historical series on hourly earnings of private production and nonsupervisory employees, and the UK wage data come from the Long Run Back Series (1963-1999) and the Average Weekly Earnings data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) (2000-2015). The UK series reflect average earnings in the whole economy and are transformed to hourly wages.

social benefits, and 46% of total social reproduction. See Table S1 Note 2 for more information on how we split by gender the social benefits components that are not available at the individual level.

We calculate average household-level and gender-specific paid work, home production, and social benefits flows across all households and by household income quintile group. The lowest-earning quintile (Q1) can be thought of as “low-income” households. In 2013, these households earned on average \$14,233 in the US and \$12,649 in the UK. The second to lowest earning quintile (Q2)—the “lower-middle-income” households—earned on average \$33,606 in the US and \$23,076 in the UK in 2013. Households comprising the “middle-income” households (Q3) earn between \$54,371 in the US and \$34,515 in the UK in 2013. The “upper-middle-income” households (Q4) earn between \$84,736 in the US and \$51,914 in the UK in 2013. Finally, the highest earning “upper-income” households (Q5) earn at least \$184,570 in the US and \$101,852 in the UK in 2013.⁹

All calculations use survey weights to adequately represent the population. Because not all datasets include data for the same years, some measures draw from data for the year before or after the focal year. See Table S2 for more information.

Our operationalization of the three flows of social reproduction is distinct from various other social reproduction analyses for several reasons. First, due to data limitations, we abstract from both wealth (inheritance, saving, dissaving) and borrowing (consumption smoothing and debt repayment), although both components are clearly important to household social reproduction and economic inequality (Roberts 2013). Second, our analysis of the state’s role in household social reproduction is comprised of direct government transfers, as well as public expenditures on healthcare and education, but does not include an estimated share of total public spending.¹⁰ This means that our analysis excludes components of the welfare state’s contribution to social reproduction through public good provision such as physical infrastructure, sanitation, transportation, recreation, cultural institutions, and so on. Third, our quantification of social reproduction does not capture the emotional, affective, intimate, or biological aspects of women’s reproductive labor.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our analysis. We report the sample size for the two survey datasets we use (LIS and MTUS) and estimates of the three flows of social reproduction: paid work, home production, and social benefits. Households’ average paid work income and social benefits income has increased over time in both countries. Although both countries experienced declines in average time spent in home production, the income value of home production has declined in the US but increased in the UK. As we will detail below, this reflects the fact that average wages stagnated in the US but grew in the UK.

⁹ Average incomes are for 2013, computed in 2011 USD.

¹⁰ Other analyses of social reproduction, such as Moos (2021) estimate the shares that socio-economic classes receive of total government spending on public goods, making the government share larger than in our analysis. Due to our different accounting methods, data sets, and socioeconomic groupings of households, our findings are not directly comparable to Moos (2021).

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.

		Sample size		Paid work	Home production	Social benefits	Time spent on home production per day		Average wage
		LIS	MTUS				Women	Men	
US	1974	11475	6913	38756.79	50255.54	5383.85	4.80	2.00	20.24
	1985	58897	2701	37045.48	43651.48	6271.64	4.20	2.30	18.31
	1995	49682	1133	41204.88	42897.6	7584.87	4.20	2.50	17.20
	2004	76447	12851	48324.77	47423.12	8863.45	4.40	2.60	18.68
	2013	51498	10410	48208.35	45916.46	11501.65	4.00	2.50	19.44
UK	1974	6695	14746	18208.41	16177.64	2628.67	4.50	1.30	7.61
	1987	7154	10100	16399.7	23284.9	6423.42	4.50	2.00	9.62
	1995	26435	1843	21234.9	25306.28	7649.61	4.00	2.00	11.48
	2005	28029	4748	29384.51	34901.92	11672.48	4.10	2.40	14.15
	2014	19535	14285	28628.45	32428.18	14122.56	3.90	2.30	14.28

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Note: Selected years in each decade, years selected based on data availability (see Table S2 for more details).

3 Results

We begin by analyzing differences in the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction across household income quintiles in the two countries. Table 2 shows households' average reliance on each of the three flows – paid work, home production, and social benefits – expressed as a percent of total social reproduction. These averages are calculated over the entire period of study and percentage change measures, discussed below, measure over-time changes. For instance, the 0.54 value corresponding to home production for households in the bottom quintile (Q1), indicates that the value of home production represents 54% of the total value of social reproduction flows (or the sum of the monetary value of paid work, home production, and social benefits). Tables S3-S6 in the appendix contain the monetary value assigned to each flow as well as the components such as pensions, private and public health expenditures, educations, and other measures.

Table 2. Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Shares and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Household	Average	0.54	0.48	0.44	0.43	0.32	0.62	0.51	0.43	0.40	0.28
Production	% change	-28.95	-23.21	-19.54	-20.35	-26.13	-1.97	10.99	21.47	10.55	3.68
Paid Work	Average	0.08	0.28	0.43	0.49	0.63	0.05	0.16	0.31	0.41	0.58

	% change	28.18	10.21	-1.64	5.11	9.35	48.39	-44.59	-31.06	-4.62	6.75
Social	Average	0.39	0.24	0.12	0.08	0.06	0.34	0.33	0.26	0.20	0.14
Benefits*	% change	59.65	58.52	157.02	215.09	137.16	-3.10	27.90	18.23	-8.89	-25.06

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: The US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because average general benefit amounts are small.

The analyses show that differences in social reproduction by household income are generally similar in both countries, albeit with some important between-country contrasts. In both countries, we see that for low-income and lower-middle-income households (Q1 and Q2), home production contributes the most, an average of nearly 54% and 48% in the US and 62% and 51% in the UK over the time studied. For low-income households in both countries, public benefits contribute a substantially larger share than paid work—39% social benefits versus 8% paid work in the US and 34% social benefits versus 5% paid work in the UK. This reflects the inadequacy of low-wage work in both countries, and how the welfare state is an important part of the social reproduction of the lowest paid members of society.

Middle-income households (Q3) in the US and UK are also heavily dependent on home production—it contributes an average of 44% in the US and 43% in the UK over the time studied. But the two countries diverge in the extent to which these middle-income households rely on paid work and social benefits. In the US, paid work represents 43% of the total value of social reproduction and social benefits represent only 12%. By contrast, in the UK, paid work for middle-income households represents 31% and social benefits 26%. This difference in the relative contribution of social benefits and paid work for middle-income households is one indication of the divergence between the two welfare regimes.

Upper-middle-income (Q4) and upper-income (Q5) households display similar patterns in both countries, although between-country distinctions emerge here as well. Only in these higher-earning income groups does paid work contribute the largest share to household social reproduction. In the US, wages and benefits contribute a larger share to household social reproduction, an average of 49% for upper-middle-income households and 63% for upper-income households. In the UK, the share of paid work is smaller with 41% for upper-middle-income and 58% for upper-class households. Social benefits contribute the smallest share to the two higher-income groups' social reproduction, but it is *not* negligible. This is especially true in the UK where it represents an average of 20% and 14% for upper-middle-income and upper-income households, respectively. In the US, social benefits contribute substantially less to these income groups than in the UK—only 8% to upper-middle-income and 6% to upper-income households. This divergence is largely due to healthcare provisioning—which continues to be observable over time in our analysis.

Transformations in the Socioeconomic Organization of Social Reproduction over Four Decades


Did neoliberalism fundamentally change the way different groups of households rely on paid work, home production, and social benefits? Figure 1 plots households' reliance on the three

flows of social reproduction by household income and decade, and Table 2 displays the overall percentage change over the study period as a synthetic measure. Our analyses reveal important between-country differences that partly reflect welfare path dependency. Overall, the US experienced more changes in the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction than the UK. In the US, all income groups experienced some degree of reorganization of social reproduction, although these changes were most pronounced for the lowest income groups. In the UK, social reproduction was most noticeably reorganized for lower-middle and middle-income households (Q2 and Q3) than for other groups. In the US, there was greater reliance on employer-based benefits, while this was not the case in the UK. There were increases in social benefits in both countries—but the sources were different.

Figure 1. Social Reproduction Flows by Household Income Quintile, 1970s to 2010s.
Panel A. United States



Panel B. UK



Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

The role of home production shifted in markedly different ways in the US and the UK. In the US, all household income groups experienced reductions in the share of home production that resulted from a combination of declines in time spent on home production and wage stagnation. For instance, in 1974 the average time spent on home production for households among middle-income households (Q3) was 6.9 hours per day and the average wage was \$20.20 (2011 USD), whereas by 2013 the average time spent on home production for households in the same quintile had fallen to 6.3 hours per day but the average wage remained \$19.40 (2011 USD). By contrast, in the UK the share of home production does not experience the same uniform decrease, although time spent on home production declined too. This is because UK average wages grew over this period, unlike in the US, thus offsetting reduced time investments on home production.

The two countries also show divergence in how the role of paid work in social reproduction shifted over the past four decades. In the US, reliance on paid work increased for all household income groups except for middle-income households (Q3), while in the UK reliance on paid work decreased for most household income groups except for the bottom and top household income groups. Examining the components of paid work reveals that employer-based benefits are key to explaining these divergent trajectories in paid work's contribution to social reproduction.

In the US, employer-provided healthcare and pensions played a major role driving increases in the share of paid work for all household income groups, while earnings increases played only a modest role for most household income groups except for the top earners (see Appendix Table

S5 for details). In the UK, by contrast, changes in paid work were driven by dissimilar shifts in earnings and employer-based benefits across household income groups. Low-income households (Q1), for instance, saw increases in earnings and employer-based pension contributions that increased paid work's share of total social reproduction. Lower-middle-income and middle-income households (Q2 and Q3), however, saw decreases in paid work contributions driven by decreases in earnings that outweighed the increases in employer-based pension contributions. Higher income households (Q4 and Q5) experienced relatively smaller changes in the share of paid work. Both groups saw increases in earnings and employer-provided pensions in absolute terms. For upper-middle-income households these changes were very small and shadowed by the increased share of home production driven by average wage growth. For upper-income households the increases in earnings were more substantial and resulted in paid work representing a higher share of total reproduction over this period (see Appendix Table S5 for details).

Changes in the share of social benefits relative to the other main components of social reproduction also display important contrasts between the two countries. In the US, all income groups experience an increased share of social benefits, which was larger for middle- and higher-income household groups (Q3-Q5). In the UK, the middle three household income groups (Q2-Q4) experienced an increase in the relative reliance on social benefits while those on the tails experienced decreases. However, when measured in absolute terms, all household income groups in the UK and in the US saw increases in the amount of social benefit flows. In the US, these increases were driven by public spending on education and health. In the UK, they were driven by increases in most social benefits, except for public spending on education that declined over this period. For lower-income households, the increases in social benefits come mostly from unemployment and income support programs, while for higher-income households the increases in social benefits stem from increased government spending on health care.

The different shifts in the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction in the two countries reflect similarity and dissimilarity in the US and UK socioeconomic organization of social reproduction. While we do see evidence of a common approach to the organization of social reproduction in the Anglo-American model—one that is market-oriented and relies on paid work and the family—we also see key differences in the two country's social welfare provisioning, which Walby (2020) describes as the difference between “neoliberal” versus “a mix of neoliberal and social democratic.” As suggested by the literature, the UK appears more redistributive across the income gradient than the US. Korpi (2000), Lewis (2001) and others have emphasized that policy changes in the neoliberal era have attempted to make paid work obligatory for adults—even older people and single mothers. However, state support remains an important part of social reproduction in both countries, even as benefits are tied to labor force participation.

The difference in healthcare models is particularly important to explain how the role of paid work and social benefits evolved over time in the two countries. The US private-public

healthcare model¹¹ means that growing healthcare costs contribute to increases in paid work (via employer-provided healthcare) and in social benefits for low-income households and households with older adults. By contrast, the UK's National Health Service (NHS) is universal and translates into increases in social benefits for all household income groups.

The other important driver of between-country differences relates to the dynamics of aging—which manifests as increased spending on pensions and healthcare. In the US, employer-provided pensions have increased more than government spending on pensions, while in the UK both have experienced remarkable growth, although this growth has been more pronounced for higher-income households. There are signs that commitments to the social reproduction of the previous generations are increasingly vulnerable—as cuts to benefits levels and raising of retirement ages make clear.¹² The social reproduction of older people is a crucial function of the welfare state and is necessary to ensure the confidence and future well-being of workers. Any reductions in state spending on the elderly—or in reductions in traditional pensions from employers—will have major implications on the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction. Individuals and families pick up the slack left by dwindling state support and insecure private savings through increased household production and working into more advanced years. This leads to greater commodification and familiarization of the social reproduction of older people, further exacerbating the risks of the Anglo-American model for individuals and families.

As suggested by other SRT authors, our work also reveals a contradictory and conflicting influence of neoliberalism on the state's role in social reproduction in both countries. There is little dispute that neoliberalism has led to a deterioration of the quality and quantity of public services in both countries—often with devastating effects for human well-being. Yet, despite neoliberal rhetoric, the actual share of the state's role in public goods provision has *risen* in the last four decades for all income groups in the US. In the UK, the share of social benefits contribution to social reproduction has risen for lower-middle-income and middle-income households. We believe that the relative share of government social benefits has risen due to the stagnation of wages and time pressures on the household—economic and social changes which were brought on by neoliberal policy. In other words, the same ideology and policy agenda which aimed to propagate a market-led distribution of social reproduction within individual households and society at large, had the opposite effect.

¹¹ The US public sector only provides public health *insurance* for specific groups of people, concentrating on the elderly (Medicare program) and low-income populations (Medicaid program). The US government also provides health insurance to public employees and healthcare to Veterans. The remainder of the population relies on employer-provided insurance, market insurances, or is uninsured.

¹² In the UK, between 2010 and 2018, the state pension age for women rose from age 60 to 65—making it on par with men's retirement ages. It rose again to 66 for both men and women between 2018 and 2020. It will increase once more to 67 between 2026 and 2028.

3.2 Women’s Share of Household Social Reproduction

Next, we focus on the gendered dynamics of the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction, which has been underexplored due to data limitations. Table 3 shows women’s average contribution to each social reproduction flow as well as women’s average contribution to total social reproduction over the study period. The analysis reveals striking similarities in the patterns of women’s contribution to social reproduction by household income groups between the two countries, suggesting strong commonalities in gender regimes.

Table 3. Women’s Share of Social Reproduction, Average and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social	Average	0.69	0.59	0.53	0.46	0.43	0.72	0.62	0.52	0.45	0.42
Reproduction	% change	-11.89	-6.47	0.00	11.66	0.71	-18.40	4.76	15.12	11.96	8.71
Household	Average	0.74	0.68	0.67	0.56	0.65	0.78	0.73	0.67	0.57	0.64
Production	% change	-8.90	-8.21	-12.45	-5.44	-13.62	-22.95	-17.87	-16.43	-7.89	-16.84
Paid Work	Average	0.53	0.47	0.40	0.36	0.31	0.56	0.39	0.31	0.31	0.29
	% change	3.48	16.73	50.42	64.32	46.45	10.62	89.25	100.1	60.13	61.16
Social	Average	0.66	0.53	0.48	0.45	0.42	0.64	0.57	0.52	0.50	0.49
Benefits*	% change	-9.26	1.62	-2.75	-5.76	-12.97	-10.28	7.59	10.91	5.94	1.01

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: The US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because the general benefits amounts is small.

In both countries, women bear greater overall responsibility for social reproduction in lower-income households compared to higher-income households. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) contribute an average of 69% in the US and 72% in the UK to their households’ overall social reproduction. For this group, the important role of women’s contribution reflects the importance of home production but also women’s contributions to paid work and social benefits. In both countries, as household income increases, women’s share of overall social reproduction declines, largely due to women contributing less to paid work than their high-earning partners—but also contributing relatively smaller shares of home production and social benefits as well. Overall, we observe that in both countries, women’s contribution to *all* social reproduction components declines as household income increases.

Women’s share of home production is above 50% across all household income groups in both countries. It is important to note that in both countries, women’s share of home production declines as household income increases. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) perform 74% and 78% of home production in the US and the UK, respectively. Women in middle-income households both perform 67% of household production in both countries, and women in upper-income households (Q5) contribute 65% and 64% of home production in the

US and the UK, respectively. The fact that women in higher-income households appear closest to achieving an equitable distribution reflects higher involvement in home production by men compared to lower-income households. See Appendix Table S8 for details.¹³

Compared to home production, women's contribution to paid work is smaller but substantial across all household income groups, and women's contributions are also more substantial for lower-income households than in higher-income households in both countries. For instance, women in lower-income households contribute more than half of paid work—53% in the US and 56% in the UK—while women across all other income groups contributed less than 50% in both countries, with contributions ranging from 47% to 29%. This household income gradient reflects both gender differences in time investments in paid work as well as gender earnings differentials, both being larger for higher income households compared to lower income households in the two countries. See Appendix S9 for more details.

Women's share of social benefits follows the same household income gradient pattern as all other social reproduction flows—with women's contributions being higher for lower-income than in higher income households in both countries. Differences across household income groups, however, are weaker in social benefits than in home production and paid work. For instance, women in low-income households (Q1) receive 66% and 64% of their households' social benefits in the US and the UK, respectively, while women in upper-middle-income households (Q4) receive 45% and 50% respectively. There are two main reasons why women in lower-income households receive a larger share of household social benefits than their more affluent counterparts. First, there are more female-headed households—typically single mothers—among lower-income groups. This affects not only eligibility for social programs, but also how we calculated male and female shares of household social benefits.¹⁴ The second reason is that women in lower-income and lower-middle-income households have higher rates of labor force participation—which makes them eligible for more in-work government benefits such as tax credits, unemployment insurance, and public pensions. As both countries have shifted welfare provision towards in-work benefits, access to the social benefits is increasingly a function of labor force attachment.

Transformations in the Gendered Organization of Social Reproduction over Four Decades

Did neoliberalism or feminism fundamentally shift the gendered organization of social reproduction in the US and the UK? To examine this question, Figure 2 plots women's share of paid work, home production, social benefits, and total social reproduction by household income and decade. Table 3 displays the overall percentage change in each of these measures over the study period as a synthetic measure. In contrast to our results for the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction, we find that the gendered organization of social


¹³ Supplementary analyses that use a broader definition of home production to include supervisory care show that the volume of home production grows substantially but that women's share of home production remain similar to the measure used in the main analyses. Analyses available upon request.

¹⁴ When a household did not contain an adult male, all social benefits were allocated to the female adults. See Appendix Table S1 Note 2 for more information.


reproduction did not dramatically change and that the change it experienced was relatively similar in the two countries.

Figure 2. Women’s Share of Reproduction Flows by Household Income Quintile, 1970s to 2010s.

Panel A. United States



Panel B. United Kingdom



Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Both countries have seen declines in women’s share of home production, which reflect increases in men’s and declines in women’s time spent on home production across all household income groups. This decline in women’s share of home production is more pronounced among lower-income households, and these declines have contributed to reduce women’s share of *total* social reproduction, particularly in lower-income households where home production represents a large share of total social reproduction (this is the case for US Q1 and Q2 and UK Q1).

Changes in women’s share of paid work display more between-country divergence. While women’s share of paid work increased across all household income groups in both the US and the UK, the household income groups that experienced more change are somewhat different in the two countries. In the US, the increase in women’s share of paid work is more pronounced as household income increases, with the exception of high-income household showing a smaller increase in women’s share of paid work than the upper-middle-income household group. In the UK, the increase in women’s share of paid work follows an inverted U-shape, with increases being largest for middle-income household groups than in the tails. These shifts in women’s share of paid work reflect increases in women’s earnings across all household incomes combined with declines in men’s earnings for middle-income households and increases in men’s earnings for the lowest and highest income households in both countries. Also contributing to this pattern is the fact that women see larger increases in pensions than men.

Finally, changes in women's share of social benefits are also distinctive between the two countries. In the US, women's share of social benefits has declined for all household income groups, except for low-middle income group (Q2). The components driving this decline differ by income group. For low-income households (Q1), increases in general benefits and public health spending that benefit more men than women are key. For higher-income households (Q3-Q5), the main driver of the decline in women's share of social benefits are increases in contributory pensions that benefit men relatively more than women. In the UK, women's share of social benefits declines for the low-income households (Q1) and increases for all other income groups (Q2-Q5). Increases in family benefits that are received by more women relative to men are an important driver of the increase in women's share of social benefits for income groups Q2-Q5.

Our analysis shows that women's shares of total social reproduction across household income groups appears to become more gender egalitarian in both countries over the four decades. This could be interpreted as signally more equitable arrangements within households with regards to household social reproduction. While there appears to be a tightening of the difference in women's relative contribution, we urge caution in interpreting this as evidence of an equalization of gendered responsibilities for social reproduction in either country. Another interpretation is that our results demonstrate the intensification of women's responsibilities for social reproduction during the late 20th and early 21st century. Women are still responsible for the bulk of household production, even as their contributions through paid work have increased—a demonstration of the well-known “second shift” for women who work outside the home (Hochschild and Machung 2012). While there is some evidence of changes in the distribution of paid and unpaid care work between men and women within socioeconomic groups, there has not been a radical change. As Bloome *et. al* (2019) note, there are persistent “gender asymmetries” in the income attainment process between men and women. Furthermore, progress with regards to a more equitable distribution of the responsibility for social reproduction may be vulnerable to social and economic crises—at the level of the household, nation, or globe—as the over-reliance on women's paid and unpaid socially reproductive labor during the Covid-19 pandemic made clear (Stevano *et al* 2021).

4 Discussion

The patterns of macro-level transformations on the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction are strongly influenced by path dependence. Our analysis reveals that before and during the neoliberal turn in both countries, the socioeconomic organization of household social reproduction in the US and UK display nuanced differences. They also experienced differences with regards to how neoliberalism “triumphed” in each country. On the other hand, the two countries continue to share remarkable similarity with the gendered organization of social reproduction. This suggests that feminism in the neoliberal context have influenced this distribution of social reproduction between men and women in similar ways but have not radically restructured gendered roles and social reproduction responsibilities. We do not find that neoliberalism nor feminism have demonstrably destabilized, refamiliarized, or degendered social reproduction in either country.

While the two countries have shared similar rhetorical and policy aims, the actual experience with neoliberalism has been different. This is strongly influenced by differences in the underlying welfare state model and how policy reforms have evolved in the context of previously determined social commitments. First, in terms of state provisioning, the UK model can still be interpreted as a less extreme version of neoliberal model than the US. Yet, despite the evidence that there is greater universalism in social provisioning in the UK, there appear to have been greater losses caused by austerity. This has been particularly clear for education expenditures. On the other hand, it appears that wage stagnation has had a greater effect in the US than the UK—which reflects in our measurement of both paid and unpaid work. The US appears to have pursued—and accomplished—a greater assault on workers, which has, paradoxically, led to an increased role of the state in social reproduction. In fact, Moos (2019) argues that in the US, social spending for the working-class net of taxation has expanded during the neoliberal era due to rising healthcare costs and aging, as well as greater economic vulnerability to economic crisis and precarity. Taken together, this means that we observe that while the UK started—and remains—more generous in terms of state spending for social reproduction, the US has experienced larger growth of the relative contribution of government social benefits to household social reproduction than the UK. It is important to note that cuts to social spending and reductions in worker-bargaining power (and therefore wages) are both consequences of neoliberal policy—but demonstrate how different political agendas have been pursued and ultimately triumphed in each country. As noted by various scholars, neoliberalism is not a singular policy agenda, nor does it manifest identically in different contexts.

While the socioeconomic organization reflects nuances in the welfare state models, we find that the gendered organization of social reproduction in the two countries is remarkably similar, suggesting that shared characteristics of the two gender regimes structure the gendered distribution for social reproduction in stratified societies. Our analysis highlights that women’s responsibility for social reproduction varies by socioeconomic group. We find that the lower a woman’s socioeconomic status, the greater her contribution to her household’s overall social reproduction, along with each of the main components—household production, paid work, and receipt of social benefits. The higher a woman’s socioeconomic status, the lower her overall contribution to her household’s overall social reproduction. The differences between women of different socioeconomic groups are nearly identical in the two countries. This highlights the socioeconomic dimension of struggles for gender equality. Underlying our quantitative analysis, are socioeconomic inequalities between women, which have grown increasingly disparate during our period of study. One possible explanation for the lower contributions to social reproduction among women in higher-income households, particularly as it relates to home production, may be the reliance of these households on paid care work. Women in higher income categories rely on women in lower-income groups to provide paid services to substitute for their household production.

It is not possible to isolate the unique influence of neoliberalism or feminism on the changing patterns of socioeconomic and gendered reorganization, as the two movements intersected during our period of study. The feminist scholarship on the relationship between neoliberalism

and feminism is broad and contentious.¹⁵ While some authors such as McRobbie (2009) see neoliberal politics in the UK as neutralizing feminist politics, other such as Eisenstein (2009) argue that feminism colluded in its own erasure. Fraser (2009) describes the “elective affinity” between neoliberal efforts to expand capitalist exploitation—through the proletarianization of women and undermining of state support—and feminist critiques of androcentrism and the paternalist aspects of the welfare state. Newman (2013) argues that feminism and other social movements “formed a ‘perverse alignment’ with neoliberal logics” (p.212). We view evidence of this “elective affinity” or “perverse alignment” in the following ways.

First, both the US and the UK have underinvested in social welfare during this period. While this has not led to a simple story of reductions in state spending—especially in the US case—it has compromised social reproduction for the most vulnerable members of society and reinforced the ideology that social responsibility is a matter of “personal responsibility” or family obligation. We do not blame feminism for the renegotiation of state commitments to social reproduction, as this was part and parcel of the neoliberal agenda (Cooper 2017). However, when the politics of feminism prioritize equality in the workplace for high-skilled women, they implicitly condone social stratification based on class, race, nationality, and other types of social difference. This ultimately subsumes struggles for greater state support and universal entitlements irrespective of labor force participation to fights for equality of access for elite women. We see evidence of this in that higher-income women make lesser contributions to their households’ social reproduction than their lower-income counterparts. Low-income women continue to bear the greatest burden for social reproduction due to a gendered economic system that over-relies on their paid and unpaid labor. While social benefits play an important role in social reproduction, especially for lower-income households, they do not fundamentally alter the underlying systems of social stratification by gender and class.

Second, as Newman (2013) discusses, mainstream feminism’s view of paid work as emancipatory was consistent with capital’s desire for a flexible workforce. Women increased their participation in the paid workforce at a time when employers were eager to employ cheaper female workers. State policy also supported the expansion of the market for low-wage labor. Low-income women are often employed in low-wage jobs that supply substitutes for higher-income women’s home production—childcare, food preparation, cleaning services, and so on—that make it possible for middle- and higher-income women to participate in the labor force. Furthermore, the expansion of the labor supply and degradation of job quality—particularly in the US—led to a corresponding deterioration of the male wage, and a feedback effect of more households relying on two adult earners. We see this in our empirical results as women’s contributions to social reproduction through paid work increased, as men’s contributions to social reproduction through paid work—especially wages—declined. In other words, the growth of women’s contribution to social reproduction through paid work—especially for the lower- and middle-income groups—does not signify gender liberation or equality but rather a consequence of a political-economic assault on workers.

¹⁵ For a review of the literature focused on the US and UK, see Newman (2013).

Finally, mainstream second-wave feminism never resolved its internal tensions with the role of unpaid work. While the role of the housewife was problematized by Friedan (1963) and others, this version of feminism did not present a coherent vision of how household or societal social reproduction should be organized upon winning women's "liberation." As Ferguson (2020) has argued, the focus of "equality feminism" was not about restructuring the distribution of social reproduction between institutions, genders, or socio-economic classes. Socialist feminist movements, such as the Wages for Housework campaign, were present but marginal in both countries—and did not put forth a coherent vision of how this restructuring might take place (Weeks 2011). The consequence of feminism's unresolved theoretical issues with unpaid work manifests in our empirical results as the observation that unpaid home production has only been partially de-gendered and the socio-economic structure that especially taxes lower-income women remains intact. Societal gains in this regard have been modest.

5 Conclusion

Our analysis quantitatively measures the structure and transformation of the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction in the US and the UK—two variants of the Anglo-American model—over four decades. This quantitative exercise illustrates the outcomes of a social stratification process where gender and class intersect—and the relationship of neoliberal and feminist projects in transforming and maintaining the organization of social reproduction.

An interchange between gender regime theory and social reproduction theory has offered a useful theoretical framework to examine the organization of social reproduction within gender regimes. Rather than identifying the distribution of paid and unpaid work or women's labor force participation as final outcomes, we have conceptualized the outcome of macro-level transformations as the material basis that structures households' ability to socially reproduce themselves.

Future research could explore the organization of social reproduction in diverse welfare and gender regime models. Our analysis of the Anglo-American model would be enriched by investigating if the socioeconomic and gendered organization of social reproduction is demonstrably different in social democratic or corporatist welfare state models. It would be especially fruitful to explore how neoliberalism and feminism have or have not influenced the structure and transformation in a more diverse set of welfare and gender regimes. Furthermore, our analysis does not offer a normative view of how social reproduction *should* be organized between genders or institutions in an egalitarian society. This is an open question which could be pursued in future research, drawing on rich and diverse intellectual traditions in feminist scholarship.

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Appendix

Procedures to merge datasets.

Our study combines data from two separate harmonized individual-level datasets from population surveys (LIS and MTUS) and four aggregate-level data sources (OECD, UNESCO, FRED, and ONS). Below we describe the process we followed to merge these datasets.

Our main dataset is the LIS, which we use to calculate key quantities related to paid work and social benefits. We use the LIS to create a summary statistics dataset that contains the average quantities of each component of interest (i.e., labor earnings or unemployment benefits). Averages are calculated for women and men in each household income quintiles group. The resulting data shows women's and men's averages by household income quintile, year and country.

Separately, we calculate a similar summary statistics dataset using the MTUS, estimating the average quantities of home production time for women and men in each household income quintile group. We merge the MTUS summary statistics dataset to the LIS summary statistics dataset by year, country, and household income quintile group. The result of this merge is a LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset.

The aggregate-level data sources are merged to our data in two ways. First, data on educational spending (UNESCO and FRED) as well as on health spending (OECD) are merged to the individual-level LIS data before creating the LIS summary statistics dataset. UNESCO and FRED provide education spending per child and we use it to assign each specific household an education transfer based on how many school-aged children live in the household. For instance, if a household has three school aged children, this household is assigned three times the per-child educational spending corresponding to their country and year. These assignments are split by gender based on the sex distribution of the adults in the household. For instance, in a single-mother household with two children the value of women's educational transfer would equal two times the per child educational spending and the value for men's educational transfer in this household would be zero. Once these values have been assigned, we can calculate average educational transfers received in each household income quintile group, just like we calculate the average labor earnings or unemployment benefits.

The OECD health spending data is employed similarly and is also directly merged to the individual-level LIS dataset before creating the LIS summary statistics dataset. The OECD reports per capita values by country and year and we use it to assign each specific household a health transfer based on the number of residents in the household (including children and adults). For instance, a household with 5 individuals is assigned five times the per-capita health spending corresponding to their country and year. For the UK, this procedure is straightforward because everyone is covered under the National Health Service and we ignore the small percentage of people who purchase additional healthcare insurance. Thus, each household receives a per-capita spending of the National Health Service according to its size. For the US, this same procedure introduces measurement error that is worth discussing. Since the OECD data only provides per-

capita spending in private and public health insurance and the LIS does not have measures indicating whether individuals receive public or private-employer based insurance, we are limited to assign household-specific private and public health transfers solely based on the household size, just like we do for the UK. Of course, this overestimates health transfers for households in which individuals do not receive either public nor private health care based on this broad per-capita data. However, we are unable to improve on this measurement given the OECD and LIS data limitations. In supplementary analyses with the US sample (available upon request), we substituted the OECD healthcare data for more detailed data provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). The benefit of this data is that per capita amounts are disaggregated by age and gender, allowing us to assign private healthcare amounts in a slightly more precise manner. The CMS estimates are still generous because we similarly assume that everyone who is under 65 and whose household income is above the federal poverty line is receiving private healthcare, thus assigning private insurance to uninsured individuals. Our general findings do not substantively change when we use the CMS data instead of the OECD data.

Lastly, the last two aggregate-level data sources provide, the BLS and ONS providing average wage data, are directly merged to the combined LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset. We use these values to assign monetary value to the average home production estimates by household income quintile included in the LIS-MTUS summary statistics dataset. Results do not significantly vary if we merge, instead, the average wage data to the MTUS individual-level dataset to compute household-specific monetary value of women's and men's home production and average these values.

Splitting household-level social benefits by gender.

Some of the LIS income transfer components we use to construct our social benefits measure are only measured at the household level and not at the individual level. To split these household-level transfer amounts by gender, we rely on the sex distribution of the adults in the household, which is equivalent to the procedure we use to assign school-aged children's educational transfers by gender. For instance, in a household with two men, all household-level social benefit components would be assigned to men and the value for women's social benefit components (as well as any other component) is set to zero for this household. When the household includes both women and men, we split household-level social benefit components proportionally. For example, a household-level benefit such as a housing voucher in a household with three men and two women is split in the following way: $3/5$ go to men and $2/5$ go to women.

Supplementary Tables Outline.

Table S1 describes sources used for each measure.

Table S2 describes the data availability from each data source.

Table S3-S6 provide more detailed information about the amounts and components for the socioeconomic organization of social reproduction.

Table S7-S10 provide more detailed information about the amounts and components for women's contributions to social reproduction.

Table S1. Operationalization and Sources for Key Measures.

Measure	Definition	Components	Source (variable name)
Paid Work	Sum of labor income, private pensions income, and income value of per capita employer spending on healthcare, minus income taxes and social security contributions.	total labor income	LIS (pilabour)
		income from private pensions	LIS (pi33)
		income taxes and social security contributions	LIS (pxitsc)
		employer healthcare contributions per capita	OECD (voluntary healthexp)
Home Production	Average wages multiplied by the time spent on home production.	Time spent in home production as a primary activity	MTUS (see Note 1)
		Average wage	US: BLS, UK: ONS.
Social Benefits	Sum of income from public benefits, income from public contributory and non-contributory pensions, and income value of per capita public spending on healthcare.	income from public benefits	LIS (see Note 2)
		income from public non-contributory pensions	LIS (pi31)
		income from public contributory pensions	LIS (pi32)
		government public healthcare contributions per capita	OECD (compulsory healthexp)

Note 1: The MTUS activities (codes) we use to identify time spent on home production are: food preparation and cooking (018), set table wash/put away dishes (019), cleaning (020), laundry ironing and clothing repair (021); maintain home/vehicle (022); other domestic work (023); purchase goods (024); pet care (027); physical and medical child care (028); teach and help with homework (029); read to, talk or play with child (030); supervise, accompany, other childcare (031); adult care (032), child/adult care travel (066); shop and household care travel (067). Our primary home production measure sums the time spent on all these activities as a primary activity. In supplementary analyses we construct two additional home production measures for years with more complete time diary data: a) time spent on home production as a primary and secondary activity, and b) time spent on home production as a primary and secondary activity plus time spent with children.

Note 2: The LIS income variables we use to identify social benefits are: parental leave (pi411), child allowance (hi412), unemployment (pi42), sickness and work injury benefits (pi43), disability benefits (pi44), general assistance (hi45), housing benefits (hi46), public in-kind benefits (hi47), and other benefits not captured by these categories but included in the general variable of public and social benefits (hipubsoc). Four of these variables are only available at the household level and not at the individual level (general assistance, housing benefits, public in-kind benefits, and amounts directly placed in hipubsoc). To include these values in gender-specific calculations we add up the total value of household-level public benefits variables and we distribute it to men and women evenly. For instance, in a household with the same number of adult men and women, half of these benefits are assigned to women and the other half to men, but in a household that only includes adult women, all the benefits are assigned to women.

Table S2. Data Availability across Data Sources.

		USA					UK				
		1974	1985	1995	2004	2013	1974	1987	1995	2005	2014
LIS	Total labor income (pilabour)										
	Private pensions (pi33)	NA									
	Income taxes and social security contributions (pxitsc)										
	Public non-contributory pensions (pi31)	NA									
	Public contributory pensions (pi32)	NA									
	Parental leave (pi411)	NA									
	Child allowance (hi412)	NA									
	Unemployment (pi42)										
	Sickness and work injury (pi43)	NA									
	Disability (pi44)	NA									
	General assistance (hi45)										
	Housing benefits (hi46)										
	Public in-kind benefits (hi47)										
	Other benefits (hipubsoc)										
MTUS	Home production	1975						1987			2014
OECD/FRED	Healthcare per-capita spending		1986						2004		
UNESCO	Education per-child spending										
BLS/ONS	Average wages										

Note: Gray indicates data is available for the focal year of interest. NA indicates that data is not available for the focal year, and other cells indicate the year for which we draw data when data for the focal year is not available.

Table S3. Distribution of Social Reproduction, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Total Social	Average	59638	82279	102053	136252	183010	31504	45798	58253	75184	100725
Reproduction	% change	17	11	9	3	17	78	62	57	53	70
Household	Average	31695	39477	45196	59016	57931	19483	23412	25229	30033	28106
Production	% change	-17	-14	-12	-18	-13	75	80	90	69	76
Paid Work	Average	4552	23073	44102	66752	114785	1498	7025	17516	30465	58544
	% change	50	23	7	8	28	164	-10	8	46	82
Social	Average	23391	19730	12754	10484	10293	10524	15361	15509	14686	14074
Benefits*	% change	86	77	181	225	179	73	107	85	39	28

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: US is missing general benefits data for 1974, thus this component is omitted from the social benefits flow in 1974. This omission does not substantially impact these quantities because the general benefits component is small.

Table S4. Components of Home Production, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Time	Average	4.62	5.76	6.59	8.60	8.44	4.68	5.63	6.04	7.30	6.82
	% change	-13.70	-10.85	-8.50	-14.44	-9.64	-6.90	-4.02	1.45	-10.07	-5.94
Wage	Average	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43
	% change	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Table S5. Components of Paid Work, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Earnings	Average	3980	19121	40008	67317	136882	932	6360	18875	35892	74458
	% change	26	2	-3	10	59	151	-39	-17	24	71
Taxes	Average	466	2663	6538	12762	36102	221	1373	4169	8228	19097
	% change	196	187	229	355	1006	35	-47	-27	13	72
Health	Average	660	5184	8787	10508	11678	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	776	270	172	170	180	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Pensions	Average	378	1431	1845	1689	2327	787	2037	2809	2801	3183
	% change	114	42	242	443	429	128	220	646	782	539

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Table S6. Components of Social Benefits, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Pensions	Average	6163	7040	5587	4507	4575	4502	4388	2571	1511	917
	% change	18	18	41	50	41	4	104	297	199	97
Unemployment	Average	136	297	345	338	295	195	175	159	102	76
	% change	48	-6	9	22	49	505	244	113	56	24
General Benefits*	Average	1998	1858	1157	956	728	3144	4838	3688	2177	1458
	% change	-20	124	292	291	196	206	558	1005	550	354
Education	Average	748	1562	2069	2500	2713	620	2885	5193	6468	6734
	% change	242	362	299	256	282	-27	-42	-39	-46	-42
Health	Average	14306	8756	3448	2090	1858	2062	3075	3897	4427	4889
	% change	162	124	364	603	514	267	204	207	226	236

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: US is missing social benefits data for 1974, thus these quantities for the US are calculated for the period 1985-2014

Table S7. Women's Contribution to Social Reproduction, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her Social Reproduction	Average	40311	47631	53460	62203	77707	22442	28299	30349	34039	42298
	% change	15	16	14	18	21	45	70	80	71	85
His Social Reproduction	Average	18175	33081	47727	73465	104565	9063	17499	27905	41145	58427
	% change	74	37	14	-4	19	198	52	35	39	60
Her Household Production	Average	23405	27006	30280	33315	37541	14956	16760	16739	17052	17731
	% change	-25	-21	-23	-22	-25	35	48	59	55	47
His Household Production	Average	8290	12471	14916	25700	20390	4527	6652	8490	12981	10375
	% change	9	4	18	-12	15	384	223	195	89	156
Her Paid Work	Average	2376	10786	17453	24418	36147	832	2688	5448	9660	17619
	% change	64	51	64	79	89	192	70	116	133	193
His Paid Work	Average	2135	12069	26501	42241	78514	666	4338	12067	20805	40926
	% change	53	14	-14	-15	11	137	-37	-18	19	50
Her Social Benefits	Average	14529	9839	5727	4471	4019	6654	8851	8161	7328	6948
	% change	160	244	475	497	431	55	123	105	47	29
His Social Benefits	Average	7751	8541	6310	5524	5661	3870	6510	7347	7358	7127
	% change	242	232	508	567	588	107	89	66	31	26

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: US is missing general benefits and gender-specific pension data in 1974, thus social benefits are calculated for the period 1984-2014.

Table S8. Women's Contribution to Home Production, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Women's time	Average	3.41	3.93	4.41	4.85	5.47	3.67	4.09	4.07	4.17	4.38
	% change	-21.38	-18.17	-19.88	-19.10	-21.95	-28.26	-21.18	-15.21	-17.17	-21.78
Men's time	Average	1.21	1.82	2.18	3.75	2.98	1.01	1.54	1.97	3.13	2.44
	% change	13.55	8.32	22.47	-7.88	19.76	157.91	72.17	57.10	0.78	36.46
Wage	Average	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	18.77	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43	11.43
	% change	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	-3.97	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62	87.62

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

Table S9. Women's Contribution to Paid Work, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her earnings	Average	2042	8647	14858	22850	40287	500	2427	5752	11247	22212
	% change	26	19	55	89	142	119	17	75	112	178
His earnings	Average	1938	10474	25151	44467	96595	432	3933	13123	24645	52247
	% change	25	-9	-24	-15	35	197	-57	-37	-1	41
Her Taxes	Average	229	1212	2467	4162	10408	116	509	1129	2257	5220
	% change	186	223	439	667	1425	39	-12	61	98	167
His Taxes	Average	237	1451	4071	8600	25693	105	864	3040	5971	13877
	% change	206	162	150	252	851	30	-59	-44	-7	47
Her Health	Average	362	2888	4567	5259	5706	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	712	261	169	172	188	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
His Health	Average	298	2296	4220	5248	5971	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	% change	871	283	175	168	173	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Her Pensions*	Average	202	463	495	471	561	448	770	825	669	627
	% change	86	91	173	243	163	259	468	1060	726	886
His Pensions*	Average	136	750	1201	1125	1642	339	1268	1984	2132	2557
	% change	30	16	63	106	77	49	141	523	806	475

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: US is missing gender-specific pension data in 1974, thus pensions are calculated for the period 1984-2014.

Table S10. Women’s Contribution to Social Benefits, Average Amounts and Percentage Change, 1974-2013.

		US					UK				
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
Her Pensions*	Average	3303	2811	2106	1587	1357	3001	2200	1246	744	457
	% change	11	24	53	70	81	7	108	268	182	71
His Pensions*	Average	1790	3096	2912	2523	2728	1501	2188	1325	768	459
	% change	31	13	33	39	25	-2	99	328	216	129
Her Unemployment	Average	59	105	121	108	113	53	46	57	36	27
	% change	95	47	112	70	93	4841	592	652	541	1081
His Unemployment	Average	77	192	224	230	183	143	129	102	66	49
	% change	25	-23	-23	5	26	308	153	55	21	-15
Her General Benefits*	Average	1524	1195	620	463	345	1906	3087	2124	1144	742
	% change	-31	128	457	435	264	123	566	1238	714	397
His General Benefits*	Average	474	663	537	493	383	1238	1751	1564	1033	716
	% change	28	118	185	209	149	466	544	752	414	316
Her Education	Average	518	917	1082	1260	1318	432	1766	2707	3208	3357
	% change	226	381	301	259	290	-33	-33	-33	-42	-40
His Education	Average	230	644	987	1241	1395	189	1120	2486	3260	3377
	% change	281	338	297	253	274	-10	-53	-45	-50	-44
Her Health	Average	9125	4810	1799	1053	887	1263	1752	2026	2196	2364
	% change	139	136	367	544	413	215	215	218	227	237
His Health	Average	5180	3946	1649	1038	971	799	1322	1871	2231	2525
	% change	206	111	360	670	641	371	190	196	226	235

Source: LIS, MTUS, OECD, BLS, ONS.

*Note: US is missing gender-specific pension data and general benefits in 1974, thus pensions and general benefits estimates are calculated for the period 1984-2014.
