### Intra-Financial Lending, Credit, and Capital Formation

#### Juan Antonio Montecino and Gerald Epstein

University of Massachusetts Amherst

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Thanks to ...

# Institute for **New Economic Thinking**

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#### Background and Data Motivation Data

Baseline Results VAR estimates Robustness tests

#### Extensions

Block Bootstrap Rolling VARs

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Motivation Data

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
Motivation Data

### Background

- Vast expansion of the financial system...
- Intra-financial lending: banks lending to each other
- Since the 1980s, intra-financial assets as a share of total financial assets (IFA share) has increased dramatically
- What impacts has this had on the real economy?



#### Figure : Intra-Financial Assets as a percent of GDP



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Motivation Data

### 3 perspectives

Potential impacts of increased IFA:

- 1. Financial efficiency view
  - Iower cost of capital
  - liquidity services
  - risk dispersal
  - higher credit and investment

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Motivation Data

### 3 perspectives

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- 1. Financial efficiency view
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  - liquidity services
  - risk dispersal
  - higher credit and investment
- 2. Financial instability view
  - greater "interconnectedness"  $\longrightarrow$  risk concentration
  - higher leverage and financial fragility
  - increased credit during bubble phase but unsustainably

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### 3 perspectives

Potential impacts of increased IFA:

- 1. Financial efficiency view
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  - higher credit and investment
- 2. Financial instability view
  - greater "interconnectedness"  $\longrightarrow$  risk concentration
  - higher leverage and financial fragility
  - increased credit during bubble phase but unsustainably
- 3. Financial inefficiency / rent-extraction view
  - greater rent extraction along intermediation chain
  - capital is "diverted" away from investment in real sector
  - Iower credit and investment

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Motivation Data



- Flow of Funds Accounts (FoF)
- The ideal would be to have micro-level data
- FoF is not meant to answer this kind of question
- Can't directly observe "network structure" of financial system
- But with a few (heroic) assumptions we can come up with some rough estimates

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What we can observe...

$$a_1 + a_2 = l_1 + l_2$$

where 1, 2 are different financial instruments (i.e. bonds, loans, etc.)

But we would like to observe...


$$a^f + a^n = l^f + l^n$$

where f, n denote the financial and non financial sectors, respectively

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### Methodology: calculating intra-financial lending

- Bhatia and Bayoumi (2012)
- Assume "fixed portfolio shares" for each instrument class
- In other words, assume financial sector claims on other financial institutions for each instrument reflect the sector's share of outstanding liabilities of that instrument
- That is,

 $\alpha_i = \frac{\text{financial sector liabilities}_i}{\text{total liabilities}_i}$ 

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### Methodology: calculating intra-financial lending

Once we calculate the share α<sub>i</sub>, intra-financial assets for each instrument type are given by:

$$a_i^f = \alpha_i a_i$$

And total intra-financial assets are:

$$a^f = \sum_i \alpha_i a_i$$


Therefore, the IFA share is:

IFA share 
$$=$$
  $\frac{a^f}{a}$ 

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#### Figure : Intra-Financial Asset Share



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### Methodology: VAR estimates

$$\mathbf{y}_t = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{A}_1 \mathbf{y}_{t-1} + \mathbf{A}_2 \mathbf{y}_{t-2} + \mathbf{u}_t \tag{1}$$


where

$$\mathbf{y}_{t} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathsf{IFA \ share} \\ \mathsf{Credit} \\ \mathsf{Investment} \end{bmatrix} \tag{2}$$

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#### Figure : Orthogonalized impulse response functions



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Model assumptions violated...

- Null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is rejected
- Serial correlation

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VAR estimates Robustness tests

Robustness checks:

- Restricted sample (1950Q1-1999Q4)
- Additional lags
- Exogenous controls (NBER recession dummy, 3 month Treasury, corporate profit index)
- Main results not affected by robustness tests

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### The Block Bootstrap

Solution: bootstrapping

- Does not impose distributional assumption
- Time series data means traditional bootstrap not valid
- Need to preserve "time dependent" data structure
- Randomly draw "blocks" of contiguous observations


Main results are not affected by residual non-normality

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#### Figure : Distribution of bootstrap point estimates

(a) IFA share  $\rightarrow$  Investment (t-1) (b) IFA share  $\rightarrow$  Investment (t-2)




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#### Block Bootstrap Rolling VARs

#### Figure : Distribution of bootstrap point estimatest




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#### Figure : Distribution of bootstrap point estimates



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#### Figure : Baseline model with block bootstrapped 95% C.I.

|                  | (1) IFA     |        |        | (2) Credit |         |        | (3) Investment |         |        |
|------------------|-------------|--------|--------|------------|---------|--------|----------------|---------|--------|
| VARIABLE         | 95          |        | C.I.   |            | 95 C.I. |        |                | 95 C.I. |        |
|                  | Â           | Lower  | Upper  | Â          | Lower   | Upper  | Â              | Lower   | Upper  |
| IFA (t-1)        | $0.580^{*}$ | 0.518  | 0.678  | -0.134*    | -0.148  | -0.036 | -0.068         | -0.148  | 0.090  |
| IFA (t-2)        | 0.050       | 0.000  | 0.118  | 0.082      | -0.033  | 0.204  | -0.386*        | -0.767  | -0.027 |
| Credit (t-1)     | -0.250*     | -0.686 | -0.086 | 0.897*     | 0.858   | 1.045  | 0.642*         | 0.250   | 1.205  |
| Credit (t-2)     | 0.268*      | 0.186  | 0.649  | -0.134*    | -0.198  | -0.047 | -0.162         | -0.247  | 0.607  |
| Investment (t-1) | 0.107*      | 0.067  | 0.177  | 0.023      | -0.018  | 0.033  | 0.899*         | 0.600   | 1.186  |
| Investment (t-2) | -0.047      | -0.156 | 0.018  | 0.004      | -0.020  | 0.051  | -0.202*        | -0.379  | -0.065 |
| Constant         | 0.000       | -0.001 | 0.001  | 0.000      | -0.001  | 0.001  | 0.001          | -0.002  | 0.002  |

Source: Authors' calculations.

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### Rolling VARs

Parameter stability concerns

- Do the parameters vary significantly across time?
- How stable is the estimated relationship?
- Does intra-financial lending have different effects during different periods?

Rolling VAR

- Estimate VAR model over continuous sample "windows"
- Advance estimation window one "step" at a time Allows examination of how the effects evolve over time

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Consider a case with...

- Baseline 3 endogenous variable VAR model
- Window size: 80 observations (20 years at quarterly frequency)
- Step size: 1 period

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
### Results

- Data is consistent with both the financial inefficiency & financial instability views
- There are two "regimes"
- ► Capital diversion regime 1950 to 1995 & 2008 to 2012
  - ▶  $\uparrow$  IFA share  $\longrightarrow \downarrow$  credit  $\longrightarrow \downarrow$  investment
- ▶ Bubble regime 1995 to 2008
  - IFA share and credit are complementary, but credit growth is probably unsustainable
  - $\uparrow$  IFA share  $\longrightarrow \uparrow$  credit  $\longrightarrow \uparrow$  investment

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
#### Figure : Rolling IRF (IFA share $\rightarrow$ Investment)



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




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
#### Figure : Rolling IRF (IFA share $\rightarrow$ Investment)



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#### Figure : Rolling IRF (IFA share $\rightarrow$ Credit)



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- Higher intra-financial lending is associated with slower investment
- May operate through credit channel
- No support for financial efficiency view
- Support for both financial inefficiency and instability views
- Dramatic increase in intra-financial lending has probably lowered investment

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## Thank You

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#### Table : Granger causality tests

| Equation                       | Excluded   | $\chi^2$       |  |  |  |
|--------------------------------|------------|----------------|--|--|--|
| Investment                     |            |                |  |  |  |
|                                | IFA share  | $18.38^{***}$  |  |  |  |
|                                | Credit     | 20.162***      |  |  |  |
|                                | All        | 46.246***      |  |  |  |
| IFA share                      |            |                |  |  |  |
|                                | Investment | $15.510^{***}$ |  |  |  |
|                                | Credit     | 8.302**        |  |  |  |
|                                | All        | $31.978^{***}$ |  |  |  |
| Credit                         |            |                |  |  |  |
|                                | Investment | 4.318          |  |  |  |
|                                | IFA share  | $10.525^{***}$ |  |  |  |
|                                | All        | $13.466^{***}$ |  |  |  |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 |            |                |  |  |  |

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Table : Jarque-Bera residual normality test and Lagrange multiplier autocorrelation test

|            | $\chi^2$   |
|------------|------------|
| IFA share  | 733.324*** |
| Credit     | 23.418***  |
| Investment | 21.054***  |
| All        | 777.797*** |

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#### Figure : Investment equation robustness tests

|                     | 1950Q1-2012Q4 |               |               | 1950Q1-1999Q4  |                |                |  |
|---------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|--|
| VARIABLES           | (1)           | (2)           | (3)           | (4)            | (5)            | (6)            |  |
|                     |               |               |               |                |                |                |  |
| IFA share (t-1)     | -0.113        | -0.151        | -0.132        | -0.060         | -0.057         | -0.055         |  |
|                     | (0.113)       | (0.114)       | (0.114)       | (0.139)        | (0.140)        | (0.138)        |  |
| IFA share (t-2)     | $-0.228^{**}$ | $-0.240^{**}$ | $-0.231^{**}$ | $-0.459^{***}$ | $-0.454^{***}$ | $-0.386^{***}$ |  |
|                     | (0.112)       | (0.111)       | (0.112)       | (0.141)        | (0.140)        | (0.141)        |  |
| Credit (t-1)        | $0.539^{***}$ | $0.539^{***}$ | $0.555^{***}$ | $0.579^{**}$   | $0.538^{**}$   | $0.557^{**}$   |  |
|                     | (0.171)       | (0.171)       | (0.170)       | (0.230)        | (0.237)        | (0.233)        |  |
| Credit (t-2)        | -0.128        | -0.105        | -0.107        | 0.120          | 0.140          | 0.111          |  |
|                     | (0.174)       | (0.173)       | (0.173)       | (0.243)        | (0.243)        | (0.242)        |  |
| Investment (t-1)    | $0.708^{***}$ | $0.682^{***}$ | $0.643^{***}$ | 0.630***       | $0.622^{***}$  | $0.547^{***}$  |  |
|                     | (0.064)       | (0.064)       | (0.067)       | (0.070)        | (0.071)        | (0.076)        |  |
| Investment (t-2)    | -0.062        | -0.035        | 0.028         | -0.037         | -0.030         | 0.074          |  |
|                     | (0.058)       | (0.059)       | (0.066)       | (0.063)        | (0.063)        | (0.074)        |  |
| Constant            | 0.696         | 0.951         | 0.573         | 0.303          | 0.803          | 0.331          |  |
|                     | (0.438)       | (0.659)       | (0.682)       | (0.561)        | (0.690)        | (0.708)        |  |
| Observations        | 250           | 250           | 249           | 198            | 198            | 197            |  |
| Additional controls |               |               |               |                |                |                |  |
| Recession dummy     | ✓             | $\checkmark$  | $\checkmark$  | ✓              | ✓              | √              |  |
| T-bill              | ✓             | √             | $\checkmark$  | ✓              | ✓              | ✓              |  |
| Decade dummies      |               | ~             | $\checkmark$  |                | ✓              | ✓              |  |
| Corporate profits   |               |               | $\checkmark$  |                |                | $\checkmark$   |  |
|                     | 5             | Standard er   | rors in paren | theses         |                |                |  |

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Juan Antonio Montecino and Gerald Epstein

Intra-Financial Lending, Credit, and Capital Formation

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