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Community Rights, Costs, and Benefits:

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James C. Murombedzi

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Committees, Rights, Costs and Benefits:

The Question of Natural Resource Stewardship and Community Benefits in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Program

James C. Murombedzi
The Ford Foundation
Johannesburg, South Africa

In the CAMPFIRE formulation, the resource management problems obtaining in the communal areas of Zimbabwe are the result of the absence of both the institutional capacity as well as the incentives to manage the resources in question. The CAMPFIRE solution, therefore, was to introduce new systems of group ownership and territorial rights to natural resources to communities, and provide the appropriate institutions for legitimate resource management for the benefit of these communities (Martin 1986). The implementation of this solution was attained through the enactment of an amendment to the Parks and Wild Life Act of 1975, which enables the government to delegate *appropriate authority* over the wildlife to the 'communal representatives'. The CAMPFIRE program in fact constitutes a transfer of the notion of ownership, successfully implemented with regard to individual landowners, to communal landowners (Farquharson 1993).

This chapter tests the extent to which CAMPFIRE has in fact been able to devolve ownership over wildlife to communities in the communal areas, and thereby promoted stewardship of wildlife through the production of benefits for the participating communities. To achieve this, I will proceed by first evaluating the extent to which CAMPFIRE has succeeded in eliciting stewardship of the wildlife resource by participating communities through the devolution of clear and unambiguous rights to wildlife to these communities. This is critical, given that stewardship itself is a direct result of the nature of rights that communities have to the resources in question. To what extent, then, has CAMPFIRE successfully constituted resource tenure reform for the communal landowners?

The second test will seek to establish the extent to which in addition to rights and control, benefits thus far generated in the CAMPFIRE program have in fact made wildlife management a part of the local household economies. Thirdly, while individual household benefits are themselves important in determining investment decisions at the household level, typically these benefits are mediated by other factors such as community and other investments in infrastructure and superstructure that affect the efficiency of the household economy. To this extent, it will be necessary to evaluate the implications of community level investments from the wildlife utilization benefits, and assess the extent to which these investments affect the level of household benefit.

Because the CAMPFIRE program is designed principally for the 'communal' lands of Zimbabwe, and assumes that its main purpose will be achieved by creating strong communal tenure regimes over wildlife resources occurring in these areas, it is essential to proceed on an a perception of the nature of the system of communal tenure as it applies in Zimbabwe. Communal lands refer to those areas, formerly known as Reserves and later as Tribal Trust Lands, that were created for the African population of the country through colonial expropriation of lands for the white settler community and subsequent policies aimed at creating labor reserves and simultaneously undermining African agriculture (Phimister 1986).

There continues to be considerable debate in Zimbabwe concerning the exact nature and characteristics of the tenure system operating in the so-called communal areas today. According to Cheater (1989), the current definition of communal tenure in Zimbabwe today is largely normative and based on an ideological construct, starting in the colonial era to rationalize the

racial division of land. It was also designed to create an effective basis for the indirect control of land and natural resources by the colonial state through the chiefs, and continued by the post-colonial state to justify continued state control over land. It also has been observed that the current idea of communal tenure resulted from the colonial usurpation of land, and power over land, from the traditional chiefs, which created a power vacuum that the state was not anxious to fill, thus leading to local and consensual systems of land allocation and use (Ranger 1985, 1988). Drinkwater (1991) comments that the growing power of the colonial state from 1893 onwards was based on state control of land use and land tenure in a process in which land distribution was the state's central concern. Bruce (1998), and Scoones and Wilson (1989) maintain that the current system of allocating land to communities originated with the colonial government, rather than prior to it. In this view, the attachment of communities to a discrete piece of land was a function of the colonial system of indirect rule, which passed control over land to chiefs and headmen as a substitute for direct political power. Pre-colonial self-allocation of land (Bruce 1992), significant and recurring inequalities in land holding size among the indigenous African population (Ranger 1985, 1988), and African readiness to purchase land in freehold areas (Bourdillon 1987) are cited to suggest that the communal nature of land tenure in Zimbabwe's communal areas may have been overstated.

The post-colonial Communal Lands Act of 1982 in effect vests ownership of communal lands and resources with the state and assigns Rural District Councils (RDCs) the power to regulate land holding and land use in the communal areas under their jurisdiction. According to the Act, access to communal land is in terms of the customary law relating to the allocation, occupation and use of land. RDCs regulate land use in terms of Communal Land by-laws produced by the ministry of Local Government, which provides for the planning and control of land use within council areas. In some RDCs, the constituency also includes owners and occupiers of alienated lands, held under private freehold or leasehold tenure. In such cases, the RDC has a dynamically different relationship to the private landholders. In particular, private land-holders have full control over the planning and use of the land to which they have title or which they lease. The role of the RDC in this system is to provide services. This contradiction has resulted in tensions between RDCs and its constituencies.

The National Parks and Wild Life Act (1975), as amended in 1982, gives appropriate authority over wildlife to the RDCs for the communal areas, and to the landowners for the private/leasehold tenure sector. Communal residents typically do not determine how wildlife is going to be 'produced' and how the 'benefits' so generated are to be utilized. These decisions tend to be made by the RDC and other 'outsiders'. The level of benefit is thus affected by policy decisions over which the 'wildlife producers' themselves have little or no control.

Moreover, communities also have to pay a variety of taxes and charges to the RDC for the management of 'their' wildlife. Communities do not have the right to use wildlife, only the right to benefit from the use of wildlife by others. Owners and occupiers of private lands on the other hand, can decide on appropriate wildlife uses without any external influences, and are free to appropriate all the benefits of use, or to share some of these benefits with their communal lands neighbors in the case of 'conservancies'. In practice then, appropriate authority has come to represent the decentralization of authority and control over wildlife only to the statutory land authorities with jurisdiction over communal lands, the RDCs.

Because of the absence of *formal* resource management institutions in most communities, a significant component of the implementation of CAMPFIRE has been an institutional development program aimed at creating new forms of communal organization for wildlife management. In practice, this has been implemented through the creation of village, ward and district wildlife management committees in a process led by the Zimbabwe Trust, a local NGO that has become the lead implementing agency for CAMPFIRE. The new committees are in effect sub-committees of the devolved local government units, the Village Development Committee, the Ward development Committee and the RDC. As such, they get their legal authority over wildlife through both the Parks and Wild Life Act and the Rural District Councils Act.

While this evolving institutionalization of wildlife management at the local level defines some local legal authority over the resource, the institutional development process itself has not developed into a process of defining local rights over the wildlife resource. Management has instead tended to be based on RDC control over wildlife. As such, wildlife management has been completely divorced from other local systems of rights to communal resources. The institutional development program has not attempted to identify existing ways by which communities manage other communal resources to which they have rights, and to define a place for wildlife management in this system of communal rights. Partly because of this, evidence suggests that most local people still do not view themselves as the joint owners of wildlife, but rather continue to see it as a resource belonging to either the government or the RDC (Murombedzi 1994). Because institutional development in CAMPFIRE has taken the form of creating new 'formal' institutions, it has tended to completely ignore the preponderance of existing traditional institutions in most land and resource management situations in many communities in Zimbabwe today. This is largely because, in the absence of clear rights to wildlife for the local communities, institutional development has tended to be defined outside of the communities themselves, rather than to be responsive to internal micro-political dynamics within these communities. Hence the lack of regard for local resource management decision-making mechanisms has contributed to the alienation of communities from the CAMPFIRE initiative.

Traditional authorities continue to play a leading role in managing and regulating the use of communal resources. It has been demonstrated that where resources are critical to the household economy, communities will invest in their management (Scoones and Wilson 1989). Typically, such management is undertaken through the operation of diffuse systems of rights to these resources, adjudicated locally by traditional leaders and authorities. Lack of recognition from government and programs like CAMPFIRE has not compromised traditional leaders' authority, particularly over land and natural resources (Ahmed 1998). 'Traditional leadership draws much of its legitimate authority from its embeddedness in the social and cultural life of rural communities, where discourses of 'tradition' associated with cultural identity are still persuasive for many'(Cousins 1998).

To the extent that institutional development in CAMPFIRE completely ignores the elements of local rights and knowledge systems, it is fundamentally informed by a centralizing and 'modernizing' ethic. This constitutes a huge contradiction in a program that is supposedly a decentralization program creating community forms of resource ownership. Attempts are

currently underway in CAMPFIRE to stimulate the further devolution of authority over wildlife from the RDCs to the 'producer communities' (*CAMPFIRE News* 1998, 8). The Tenure Reform Commission of 1994, for instance, recognizes that communal land tenure in Zimbabwe in effect gives all rights to communal lands to the government, and recommends that new village assemblies be created as communal property associations with clear and unambiguous rights to communal lands and resources. The Commission bases this recommendation on the operation of the CAMPFIRE program, and its demonstration of the capacity of communities to control and manage resources over which they have clearly defined rights. However, as the foregoing section has demonstrated, the CAMPFIRE program would itself benefit from the implementation of this recommendation, to the extent that it will define more clearly rights for local communities to wildlife.

It would further appear that that CAMPFIRE has not sufficiently devolved rights in wildlife to local communities to the extent where these communities can use these rights to gain an increased stake in the wildlife utilization enterprise at its multiple levels of value. Thus communities have little control over wildlife management, little or no equity in wildlife utilization, and very few opportunities to provide goods and services to the wildlife utilization industry. In this regard, community participation in CAMPFIRE can be seen as constituting little more than the receipt of handouts.

The quantification of the 'financial' and 'economic' benefits that have been generated from the various modes of wildlife utilization under the program has also been the subject of inquiry. The general conclusion has been that CAMPFIRE revenues have indeed contributed significantly to the well-being of participating communities. With a few iconoclastic exceptions (Bond 1997; Murombedzi 1992, 1994), these conclusions have generally not compared the CAMPFIRE benefits with other potential benefits from other land uses, nor have the opportunity costs of participating in the program been questioned. Secondly, very little empirical data exists on the costs that individual households in CAMPFIRE communities actually incur through wildlife predation, opportunity and transaction costs. Thirdly, individual households need to receive direct financial benefits from wildlife production: '...unless the revenues from wildlife are translated into disposable individual or household incomes decisions on wildlife/livestock options will be skewed towards livestock even in situations where it is apparent that the wildlife option is collectively more productive'(Murphree 1997, 22).

'Benefit' in CAMPFIRE has tended to be used to refer to the revenues that accrue to communities and RDCs from the utilization of the wildlife resources in specific geographic areas. Utilization usually takes the form of safari hunting, game cropping, photographic safari, or other eco-tourism ventures. Typically, calculations of benefit do not include the revenues accruing to the safari operators themselves, neither do they refer to the rights (or loss of them) accruing to the communities. Obviously, the level of household benefit is affected by several factors, chief among which is population density. Wildlife populations are densest in those areas where human population is sparsest. Human population densities are also lowest in those areas were the pastoral and arable agricultural potential of the land are severely constrained by natural climatic factors, or by inadequate physical and other infrastructure, or both. These tend to be the marginal areas that are adjacent with national parks and other protected areas. Consequently, those wards with the lowest human population density and the highest wildlife densities also

tend to have larger safari hunting operations. Because of this combination of factors, the households in these wards have, at least potentially, the highest revenues from safari hunting and other wildlife utilization operations. Other factors that affect the level of revenue include the amount of the land available to the community, and especially the amount of community land that is wilderness. Obviously the size of the community itself has implications for the level of revenues for the component households of that community.

Thus Masoka Ward in the Dande Communal Lands is regarded as the prime CAMPFIRE ward. Because of the extremely low population density and very high wildlife density (due to its proximity to the Mana Pools National Park) Masoka ward has one of the highest revenues of all the wards participating in the CAMPFIRE program. It is argued that a small increase in human population density will reduce earnings considerably as humans compete with wildlife for key resources such as arable land and water (Bond 1997). Consequently, those households with significant proportions of their incomes accounted for by wildlife earnings would be expected to be motivated to manage population expansion. However, the contrary appears to be the case in all the CAMPFIRE wards with low population densities and high wildlife revenues.

Because of the historical distribution of land in Zimbabwe, and also because of the shortcomings of the land reform program in the first eighteen years of independence, there has been a high rate of migration between communal lands, and in particular, from the higher potential, more densely populated communal lands to the more marginal less densely populated communal lands. While accurate figures on inter and intra-communal lands migration are not available, it is quite conceivable that more households have resettled themselves in other communal lands than have been officially resettled in the government resettlement program. Spontaneous settlement in communal lands has occurred against official government policy, and all attempts by the RDCs to regulate land settlement and land use. The extent of such settlement is even starker in the CAMPFIRE program areas.

Masoka, with consistently one of the highest wildlife revenues per household in the program, also appears to have one of the highest rates of in-migration compared to other CAMPFIRE wards (Nabane 1995). Although the potential impacts of migrants on wildlife habitat have been stressed to the people of Masoka themselves, they continue to strive to attract more people to come and settle in their ward, fully aware that this will have the effect of reducing the amount of revenue per household. Similar dynamics have been observed in the Dobola ward in Binga communal lands, which until recently was one of the major wildlife producing areas for Binga's CAMPFIRE program. Between 1990 and 1993, this ward experienced an influx of more than 300 households (Dzingirai 1994). What are the implications of such dynamics and how do we explain the apparent anomaly between revenues and wildlife stewardship?

The people of Masoka argue that the people who are settling in Masoka today are not necessarily new immigrants, but are mostly descendants of Masoka families who are 'coming back home' from wage labor employment. They also state that the few non-indigenous people settling in the ward are accepted mainly out of compassionate and humanitarian grounds. Needless to say, most of the settlers are not descendants of Masoka families, and in many cases are retired immigrant laborers from Malawi and Zambia, or their descendants, who have decided to settle in Zimbabwe, and do not have legally recognized claims to official resettlement land. Of course

when confronted with this fact the people of Masoka admit that this is so, but argue that they are a very small community of only a few hundred households. Their children have to leave home to attend secondary school a hundred and some kilometers away because they are too few to warrant government investment in a secondary school. Their nearest neighbors are at least sixty kilometers away, and so no bus operator will send a bus to Masoka because there are just too few travelers to warrant a sixty-kilometer trip. In any case, the road itself is impassable in the wet season because the government will not invest in its improvement since there are so few cotton growers in Masoka.

To initiate the CAMPFIRE program, Masoka community erected a perimeter solar powered electric fence around an area of some 18 square kilometers 1991 to safeguard crops and livestock against wildlife predation. Today, the community wants to realign the fence to accommodate expansion. The point is, Masoka people encourage settlement in their ward because it is the only way that they can quickly constitute a large enough constituency to leverage 'development' from the government. The settlers themselves are agriculturists, and they open up land for agriculture and thus encroach into wildlife habitat. The long-term residents are fully aware of the potential impact of this human population on wildlife habitat, and therefore on their own wildlife revenues, but the 'development' option is more attractive to them as evidenced by their choice of continued immigration despite the best advice of numerous anthropologists and their apprentices and development practitioners alike. From this example, we may be tempted to conclude that at least at this stage in the development of CAMPFIRE, participating communities view the program as a temporary windfall in lieu of long-term development. Thus, even in those wards were CAMPFIRE revenues constitute a significant proportion of household incomes, wildlife habitat continues to be lost to agricultural expansion. There can be two explanations for this.

Immigration has also been occurring in other CAMPFIRE wards. The extent of immigration into the CAMPFIRE wards of Binga district, and the connivance of powerful politicians in facilitating this movement of people is well documented (Dzingirai 1994). Earlier immigrants into Dobola ward in Binga subdivided their land to facilitate the settlement of new immigrants in order to minimize their own wildlife predation related costs by peripheralizing the wild animals. The Nyaminyami Rural District Council continues to launch paramilitary style raids, using armed CAMPFIRE game guards, to evict settlers from council lands. North Gokwe is rapidly becoming a very densely populated district, from a very small population density only a few years ago. In all these cases, the long-term residents appear to not only encourage, but to actually facilitate such immigration, because of the perceived developmental benefits of higher population densities. In fact, wildlife appears to be seen as the archetype of under-development, rather than a potential development resource.

The settlers are attracted into the CAMPFIRE areas by the eradication of the tsetse fly, which makes agro-pastoralism less risky. The tsetse fly eradication programs opened up roads in these previously unserviced areas, and thus provided some rudimentary infrastructure for potential frontiersmen, women, and children. Despite the low and erratic rainfall and poor soils of the Zambezi valley, overcrowding in other communal lands and the slow pace of land reform appear to be sufficient incentives for farmers wishing to expand their agricultural production to resettle into these marginal areas. Such farmers are attracted by the relative abundance of land in the valley, and like all settlers, they view wildlife as a wasting asset: valuable in subsidizing the

process of settlement, but constituting an impediment to long-term investment. While wildlife does not constitute an integral part of the immigrant households' accumulation plans, it appears that long term residents of the valley also do not consider wildlife to constitute an important part of their own livelihoods, and as such they are prepared to forego wildlife revenues by promoting immigration into their wilderness areas.

Another critical factor in most CAMPFIRE wards where there is a high rate of in-migration (Gokwe, Binga and Dande communal lands) is that all the areas are high cotton production areas. There does not appear to have been any attempt in CAMPFIRE research to measure systematically cash crop production in any of these wards and to compare it with wildlife revenues. What has been demonstrated, however, is the fact that most migrants into these areas are enterprising frontiersmen and women who wish to invest in expanded cash crop and livestock production. Most of these settlers originate from other communal lands, where their own capacity to accumulate through expanded cash crop and livestock production is severely constrained by land shortages due to the higher population (both human and livestock) densities in those other communal lands. They thus see the 'less developed' and sparsely populated communal lands of the Zambezi valley as a place that offers both the land for cotton production as well as adequate grazing for livestock (Dzingirai 1994; Derman 1990).

It would appear that immigrants also prefer to settle in other communal lands than to be formally resettled as a way of avoiding the perceived bureaucratic constraints of the resettlement program. Moreover, in all the CAMPFIRE communal lands, agricultural extension services continue to be geared towards encouraging the expansion of arable agriculture, rather than realigning land use to favor wildlife production. The tsetse fly eradication programs of the Zambezi valley are also justified on the basis of their potential to open up land for settlement and agricultural production. The huge mid-Zambezi Valley settlement scheme, for instance, was a policy response to spontaneous settlement in areas that had been eradicated of the fly. The scheme never had a wildlife production aspect until much later in its life (Derman 1990).

The relationship between the state and the communal landholders in effect means that the state has retained control over communal lands. The implication of this for CAMPFIRE then is that for such programs to be effective, there has to be complete and unambiguous devolution of control over communal tenure to the communal residents themselves. In effect, however, the continuation of migration into communal lands, without the sanction of the RDC as the land authority, in fact even against the intentions of the RDCs, means that while the state may have retained putative control over communal lands, the communities themselves are able to transfer this land outside of the state agencies, and with relative impunity. Given the inability of the state to control land use and land transfer in the communal lands, then, it would appear that policy ought to develop towards facilitating increased community control over so called communal lands, as recommended by the Land Tenure Commission of 1994.

Immigration into CAMPFIRE wards also demonstrates that even in most of the successful CAMPFIRE wards, wildlife benefits themselves are viewed as insufficient development resources. People participating in CAMPFIRE are prepared to lose the wildlife in return for greater human population densities, which in turn will result in central government policies that increase development and the provision of necessary social overhead capital. Bond (1997)

demonstrates that since 1989, CAMPFIRE revenues by household have actually been declining. The decline has been due mainly to the increase in the number of households participating in the program. Case studies of household investment strategies demonstrate that most households in communal areas in Zimbabwe invest significant amounts of income into agricultural production (Murombedzi 1994). This study also demonstrates that typically, household investment in agricultural production far exceeds the CAMPFIRE revenues, and that CAMPFIRE revenues tend to be significant only to the extent that they were invested in providing some infrastructure for the agricultural enterprise. Thus most CAMPFIRE wards invest their revenues not to improve wildlife management and therefore increase wildlife revenues, but rather to improve agricultural productivity. Typical ward investments of CAMPFIRE revenues include purchases of tractors and the construction of warehousing facilities for agricultural inputs and produce, as well as investment in agricultural processing technology such as grinding mills.

It has been observed that attempts to entice people's participation in conservation through the distribution of revenues from some forms of resource utilization without at the same time devolving rights to these resources to local people will not necessarily improve local stewardship of resources, regardless of the extent of these revenues. In this view, '...such benefactions exacerbate the landowners belief that they do, as an aspect of common sense and natural justice, have a prior right to both use and benefit from the natural resources on their land. Further, such benefit is inseparable from the powers of decision regarding general use that go with ownership' (Parker 1993, 3). Thus for as long as local landowners do not have these powers of decision, wildlife utilization in CAMPFIRE will also be inferior to other forms of land and resource use over which the local communities and individual households exert significant levels of control. It is also evident that the implementation of CAMPFIRE alone cannot resolve the long-standing land problem in Zimbabwe. Instead, the immigration problem in CAMPFIRE should serve to highlight the need for meaningful land reform programs to be implemented if conservation-based development is to succeed.

In addition to the problems associated with land distribution and the slow pace of land reform in Zimbabwe generally, it is evident that CAMPFIRE needs to start developing programs by which those communities living on the boundaries of, and that can claim prior rights in, protected areas should participate in the management of such protected areas and directly benefit from them. Thirdly, the costs of loss of rights of access to the wildlife resource itself need to be considered in the equation. The focus of CAMPFIRE on high value forms of utilization continues to marginalize other local needs for wildlife utilization, such as hunting. Even when wildlife is cropped for local communities, the actual cropping is done by 'professionals' in orgies of butchery as in the Nyaminyami annual impala cropping program (Murombedzi 1994). Such game cropping programs should necessarily be community-based, which will in effect cut costs and offer the communities opportunities to directly utilize the wildlife themselves. This can be done through licensing and monitoring systems that are controlled by the participating communities themselves.

Because of the weak tax base for most local authorities, wildlife immediately became the most taxable commodity. For this reason, and also because of the traditional mistrust of local people by local government staffers, it has become increasingly difficult to further devolve proprietorship of wildlife to local communities. The taxation of wildlife by local authorities has

significantly reduced the levels of local financial and economic benefit, while at the same time facilitating continued local authority control over wildlife management. The inevitable result has been that nowhere in CAMPFIRE has wildlife come to represent a viable mechanism for household level accumulation. Consequently, CAMPFIRE is seen as beneficial not to the extent that it contributes to household incomes, because this is an insignificant contribution, but to the extent that it subsidizes the local authorities.

In CAMPFIRE, then, wildlife management continues to be driven, in the main, by external policy interests rather than be a response to local dynamics stimulated by proprietorship. The RDCs with appropriate authority use this authority to provide services to a broad range of wildlife resource users, as well as to control potentially negative local community activities such as livestock grazing and arable expansion. RDCs also serve to mediate conflicts between local and other resource users, as well as to regulate the conditions under which outsiders actually access the wildlife resources. In addition, the mitigation of local contestations for access to the wildlife resource, expressed mainly through poaching, is a major function of the appropriate authority.

The CAMPFIRE focus on financial benefits appears to emphasize wildlife management for the purpose of supplying the market demands for safari hunting and tourism. Consequently, the management of other natural resources on which household livelihoods depends, perhaps even more so than on wildlife revenues, is ignored. Thus the greatest beneficiaries of the wildlife management services provided through CAMPFIRE are the Safari Operators who benefit through increased security of access to the wildlife, as well as protection from the negative local community threats to wildlife through agriculture, poaching and so on. Land reorganization and land use planning also ensures reasonable long-term security for wildlife habitat. Yet communities do not manage natural resources in isolation. Systems of rights determining the management of natural resources are diffuse, yet CAMPFIRE attempts to introduce an exclusive wildlife management regime without reference to these diffuse and nested systems of rights and management.

Employment is often cited as one of the benefits of CAMPFIRE. While there has been no attempt to document the number of jobs created in the different communities participating in the program, it is quite evident that the safari industry is capital intensive rather than labor intensive. Furthermore, the actual management of wildlife by communities is undertaken by elected committees, rather than by dedicated organizations employing staff to undertake routine tasks. Thus most local people volunteer, rather than get employed, in wildlife management in the CAMPFIRE program. Moreover, the actual methods of wildlife utilization under CAMPFIRE are patently racist, and obviously alienating and humiliating for the local populations. The safari operation industry continues to be dominated by whites, with very little participation of blacks in the skilled worker categories (hunters and guides) of these operations. The majority of black employees in the safari industry are cooks and camp attendants. The success of most safari hunts depends on the tracking skills and knowledge of local conditions and animal habits of the local trackers, who are an integral part of every safari operation. Yet these trackers are treated as unskilled laborers rather than recognized as qualified guides. Besides constituting another instance of devaluation of local environmental knowledge, this treatment of local trackers also

demonstrates the contempt with which local people tend to be regarded by the white safari operators.

The historical reasons for the domination of the safari industry by whites obtain in the appropriation of rights from the local population by the colonial state. The racist conditions under which the safari industry in Zimbabwe developed exist to this day almost unchanged. Further, in their desire to perpetuate the myth of a wild, pristine African experience for their clients, most safari operations prohibit all local access into the safari hunting camps except as lowly paid laborers, and their livestock and dogs are shot or otherwise harassed if they are seen as interfering with hunting operations (because they indicate the presence of human life in the 'pristine' wilderness). Individual Safari Operators also impose restrictions on local activities in the hunting areas, ranging from total prohibition of any form of access to some forms of negotiated access. This can only be possible because of the lack of clarity of the nature of local rights to these resources in the CAMPFIRE program. In the hunting operations themselves, where locals have insisted that members of the local communities should be attached to these hunting operations for monitoring or training purposes, there is no evidence that the so-called training programs have actually resulted in any skills acquisition by the local people. To date, not a single community trainee in any of the CAMPFIRE training programs has qualified as a guide. Locals attached to monitor the hunting operations are typically left stranded in the village due to lack of space for them in the hunting trucks, and consequently the communities remain suspicious about what actually goes on out in the bush. Where local guides and monitors actually participate in the hunt, the treatment they receive is absolutely deplorable – they are viewed more as a nuisance than an aspect of cooperation between hunter and community.

The poverty crisis facing rural households in Africa has been generally well-documented. What is not as well-documented, however, are the differential impacts of poverty on different households. One determining factor of such differentiation is micro-climatic conditions. The CAMPFIRE program postulates that wildlife management is probably the most productive form of land use in marginal ecosystems. CAMPFIRE is thus being implemented predominantly in these marginal eco-systems, where there continue to be viable wildlife populations, and where there are obvious climatic limitations to arable agriculture and pastoralism. In essence, if CAMPFIRE is to become a viable land use in such areas, it must offer a potential solution for the crisis of accumulation to the residents of these areas. Accumulation means assigning social and economic resources to improving the production process, and has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Quantitatively, accumulation means more implements, more land for arable agriculture, more marketing points, more inputs, and so on. Qualitatively, accumulation means the adoption of new and more sophisticated production technologies (mechanization, improved seed varieties, fertilizers, etc.), better land protection, and the allocation of land to more productive uses (Barker 1989).

Viewed through the lens of household accumulation, the CAMPFIRE premise is that it will foster accumulation by allocating land to a more productive land use (wildlife utilization) and ensuring that the benefits of such land use accrue directly to the individual household. Consequently, the success of CAMPFIRE in stimulating household accumulation in the marginal ecosystems has to be tested against this premise. Wildlife management in CAMPFIRE, at least for the communities involved, means local programs to enable the RDCs and communities to

control arable expansion of agriculture, grazing and livestock, through collaboration in land use planning. In some few cases such as in Masoka, land use planning is itself devolved to the local community, although this alone has been insufficient to stop the expansion of arable agriculture. Thus wildlife management defined in this way appears to entail the imposition of limitations on quantitative accumulation. There is sufficient evidence from the investment of CAMPFIRE dividends to demonstrate that accumulation for most households in the CAMPFIRE wards continues to be seen as a function of the expansion of arable agriculture and investment in livestock. In most communal areas, this accumulation is dependent on access to off farm incomes. Wildlife incomes on average are too insignificant to constitute a source of accumulation capital for most CAMPFIRE households. However, at the community level, wildlife revenues can constitute a source of capital for qualitative accumulation, mainly through the investment of revenues in the provision of agricultural services (marketing points, warehouses, sources of inputs and food processing technology).

In quantitative terms, available evidence suggests that CAMPFIRE implementation has actually constituted a constraint on the ability of households to accumulate through arable expansion or the acquisition of livestock. This has occurred through restrictions on the importation of cattle and donkeys (for draught power) into those CAMPFIRE districts that did not have them because of tsetse fly infestation, as well as through restrictions on arable agricultural expansion achieved through land use planning. Wildlife revenues have tended to be used as a carrot to encourage individuals to conserve wildlife while land use planning has been used as the stick to prevent the expansion of agriculture and to control domestic livestock.

In small, discrete, and relatively homogenous communities with access to expansive wilderness, CAMPFIRE has been a phenomenal success in terms of stimulating those communities into contesting more secure rights to the wildlife resources with local authorities. In such communities, it is evident that as community rights over resources become clearer and control enhanced, communities also begin to exert considerable influence over the actual utilization of the resource itself. The cases of Mahenye and Masoka are especially instructive. According to Bond (1997), ‘there are a relatively small number of wards in which benefit per household is very high and comparable with average household income figures for households in semi-arid communal lands’ (Bond 1997). In such cases, CAMPFIRE appears to have been particularly successful as a means for qualitative accumulation. Wildlife revenues have been invested in the development of agricultural infrastructure and equipment, which in turn are seeing as having the potential to improve the conditions for individual household quantitative accumulation.

In both respects then, it would appear that local valuations of CAMPFIRE relate to the ways in which CAMPFIRE revenues become available for individual household accumulation. Bond further observes that ‘in at least 50% of the wards the revenue earned from wildlife can at best only be considered supplementary to other sources of income’. In such cases, then, it is debatable whether in fact land use allocation will be determined by local economic imperatives. It is more likely that the households in these wards are constrained by RDC policies to participate in wildlife management, and that the CAMPFIRE programs in such wards are heavily contested. It is doubtful that in situations where wildlife management only contributes marginally to the local and household economies, individuals will be motivated to manage the wildlife beyond a certain minimum threshold, and that minimum threshold is determined by existing coercive measures

through the appropriate authority, rather than by individual commitment to the resource. In other words, where wildlife costs continue to be greater than the benefits, management of wildlife will continue to be top-down, authoritarian and coercive, and communities are not likely to seek greater rights to the wildlife resource.

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